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ABSTRACT
Wireless communication technologies have been playing an important role in mod-
ern society. Due to its inherent mobility property, wireless networks are more vulner-
able to passive attacks than traditional wired networks. Anonymity, as an important
issue in mobile network environment, serves as the first topic that leads to all the
research work presented in this manuscript. Specifically, anonymity issue in Mobile
Ad hoc Networks (MANETs) is discussed with details as the first section of research.
To thoroughly study on this topic, the presented work approaches it from an
attacker’s perspective. Under a perfect scenario, all the traffic in a targeted MANET
exhibits the communication relations to a passive attacker. However, localization
errors pose a significant influence on the accuracy of the derived communication
patterns. To handle such issue, a new scheme is proposed to generate super nodes,
which represent the activities of user groups in the target MANET. This scheme also
helps reduce the scale of monitoring work by grouping users based on their behaviors.
The first part of work on anonymity in MANET leads to the thought on its
major cause. The link-based communication pattern is a key contributor to the
success of the traffic analysis attack. A natural way to circumvent such issue is to
use link-less approaches. Information Centric Networking (ICN) is a typical instance
of such kind. Its communication pattern is able to overcome the anonymity issue
with MANET. However, it also comes with its own shortcomings. One of them is
access control enforcement. To tackle this issue, a new naming scheme for contents
transmitted in ICN networks is presented. This scheme is based on a new Attribute-
Based Encryption (ABE) algorithm. It enforces access control in ICN with minimum
requirements on additional network components.
Following the research work on ABE, an important function, delegation, exhibits
a potential security issue. In traditional ABE schemes, Ciphertext-Policy ABE (CP-
i
ABE), a user is able to generate a subset of authentic attribute key components for
other users using delegation function. This capability is not monitored or controlled
by the trusted third party (TTP) in the cryptosystem. A direct threat caused from
this issue is that any user may intentionally or unintentionally lower the standards
for attribute assignments. Unauthorized users/attackers may be able to obtain their
desired attributes through a delegation party instead of directly from the TTP. As the
third part of work presented in this manuscript, a three-level delegation restriction
architecture is proposed. Furthermore, a delegation restriction scheme following this
architecture is also presented. This scheme allows the TTP to have full control on
the delegation function of all its direct users.
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To my grandma, who, I truly feel, is watching me from heaven.
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background
With rapid development in communication technologies, various forms of networks
emerged with their specific technological advantages for different application scenar-
ios. They can provide not only high transmission rate, wide bandwidth, or low latency,
but also high reliabilities and better coverage. Mobile networking, as an important
part of daily life, is becoming inseparable to modern society. With more businesses
and activities of daily life moved to mobile devices, security, privacy and robustness
issues are getting more attentions from researchers, potential criminals, and ordinary
users. Common mobile networks are based on infrastructures, like cellular networks
and wifi. These infrastructures can sometimes be vulnerable when facing severe sit-
uations. For example, at the recent earthquake disaster in Nepal, communications
and Internet access were greatly influenced, mostly due to an outage of power and
damages to last-mile connectivity infrastructures at certain areas nep (2015a,b). In-
novative people-searching services for this earthquake provided by Google, Facebook
and other organizations would not be very helpful due to connectivity issue. Rescuers
need to rely on human messengers to pass information between areas before network
connections are recovered. Under such circumstances, infrastructure-less networks
are good options to re-establish communications at the early stage of disaster rescue.
A common form of such networks is Mobile Ad hoc Networks (MANETs).
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1.2 MANET
A MANET is a wireless network consisting of, in many cases, only mobile de-
vices, which form the network in an ad hoc approach. There is no static network
infrastructure available in such network environments. Mobile devices play the roles
of both a terminal and a forwarding party. When a client decides to send out a
message, it follows its routing protocol to pass the message to one or more of its
immediate neighbors. The neighbors will then work as a relay to forward such a
message till the message reaches its destination or the message is timed out. Several
routing protocols have been proposed Zhang et al. (2006); El Defrawy and Tsudik
(2011) for such purpose. Under such working principles, it is not guaranteed that a
reliable end-to-end connection is always available. However, its little requirement on
static infrastructures makes it lightweight and easy to deploy, which is quite suitable
for certain application scenarios. As mentioned before, in disaster rescue scenarios,
MANET is one of few options for establishing network services within the first sev-
eral hours or days. Such time frame is critical for saving lives. Another application
scenario is military usage. MANET is a good candidate for communications between
small groups of units in battlefield, where it is normally impossible to establish a
reliable communication infrastructure.
Typical attributes of a MANET include hand-held mobile devices with limited
battery life and restrained computation/storage resources. It is relatively easy to
monitor communication traffic by either eavesdropping on the wireless channels or by
capturing authentic mobile devices. Compromising an authentic device is sometimes
assumed to be relatively easy. Such potential risk may provide an attacker with all the
capabilities as an authentic user in terms of participating in normal communications.
These compromised users are usually difficult to be discovered. The open access to
2
wireless channels also poses risk to the network. Specifically, anonymity is a key issue
in such networks.
1.3 Anonymity Issue in Networks
Anonymity refers to the property that a certain party or element cannot be easily
identified from a set of similar parties or elements. In network communications, it in-
cludes multiple categories, such as sender anonymity, receiver anonymity, relationship
anonymity, etc. As their names imply, sender/receiver anonymity refers to property
that the sender/receiver of a certain message cannot be easily identified. Relationship
anonymity refers to the case that a communication relationship between two or more
parties is not easily identifiable.
Relationship Anonymity is an important issue in secure network communications.
In end-to-end communications, it means how difficult it is for an eavesdropper to infer
the identities of the two communication parties in a session. In traditional host-based
networks, the two parties can be identified by their IP addresses in IP headers. VPN
may be able to partially protect the addresses by hiding the original header and adding
an additional layer. However, VPN is not designed for such application purpose. It
cannot provide a reliable protection for anonymous communications. Relationship
anonymity is relatively more critical in wireless networks than in wired networks. This
is because it is not easy to eavesdrop on the exact route for a particular communication
pair as in wireless channels. Anyone who has an adequately-equipped antenna can
easily receive all the wireless traffic within a certain transmission range and frequency
range. It is feasible to create a network of mobile devices for such monitoring purpose,
which can cover a wide range of geographic area. Such monitoring network is normally
referred to as a traffic monitoring system, which is commonly used in wireless traffic
analysis.
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For MANETs, deploying a monitoring system is easy, effective, and worthwhile
for the cost. For example, in battlefield, deploying a set of passive signal monitors
helps the troops to easily locate enemy forces or to identify critical enemy communi-
cations. With a wide coverage of the entire area, the monitoring system can collect
a majority of the overall wireless traffic to break anonymity in enemy’s network.
It is relatively easy to monitor end-to-end communication patterns with a powerful
monitoring system.
1.4 ICN
Relationship anonymity is an inherent shortcoming for host-based network archi-
tectures. A direct host-to-host session needs to be established before data is trans-
mitted between the two communication parties through the network. Such session is
maintained during the entire process until one of the parties closes it.
Information Centric Network (ICN), as a new network paradigm, changed the
requirements for relatively static hosts in network communications. It is designed
to provide better support to large scale multicast services. Traditional host-based
architecture works well in end-to-end communications between a pair of users. How-
ever, in multicast scenarios, where one source is sending the same data to multiple
recipients, performance can be further improved. According to Cisco (2015), most of
the current network traffic is video sharing, from 64% in 2014 up to 80% by 2019.
To further improve the overall network performance, several different ICN network
architectures are proposed.
In a typical ICN network, data is represented as contents. Different contents have
different identifiers/names. They are transmitted through the network in publisher-
subscriber model. When a network party publishes a content, it registers the content
name to a naming service. Through this naming service, a subscriber who is interested
4
in such content will be notified with the name of the content. Here, names are unique
identifiers to contents in the network. Once a subscriber gets the name of the content,
it is able to retrieve a copy of the content using the name through a name-based
routing scheme. Copies of the same content may be scattered all over the network,
existing in network caches for a certain period of time, depending on what caching
algorithm they are running. Typically, if a copy of a certain content is transmitted
from one entity to another, all the network caches along the path will keep a copy
of it. In this way, next time when another entity requests for the same content, the
network is able to locate a near-by network cache, which maintains a copy of the
content, but has a shorter distance from the user.
Name based routing scheme uses content names as identifiers to route a copy of
content to its consumers. In traditional session based networking environment, each
network party is tagged with a unique identifier, for example, IP address. Network
traffic is routed based on the entity’s identifier. In ICN network, it is the content that
is tagged with a unique identifier. Routers along the network path use the content
identifiers to forward traffic. In other words, in traditional network, a routing decision
is made based on the destination address of the traffic, while in ICN network, it is
based on the content identifier to make such decisions.
1.5 Objectives
The inherent relationship anonymity issue with traditional MANET makes it inter-
esting to study how network movements and modeling affect the study of anonymity.
In one of the previous works Qin et al. (2014), the monitoring system for traffic anal-
ysis is assumed to be able to perfectly identify signals from each individual device
without any interference. However, in reality, such assumption does not hold when
two devices are closely located together. This is one of several example cases where
5
the previous perfect assumptions do not apply in real world scenario. To deal with
such issue, the proposed idea is to relax assumptions on the monitoring system to
explore the influence on traffic analysis accuracy, which constitutes the first part of
the proposed work, Chapter 2 of this dissertation.
For the second part (Chapter 3), ICN as a new paradigm has a side-effect to over-
come the anonymity issues with traditional host-based network patterns. However,
it also introduces some challenging issues that need to be addressed urgently. One
of such issue is the difficulty in establishing access control on the published contents.
In traditional network patterns, a client (consumer) needs to authenticate itself to
the server (publisher) with desired privilege to be granted with access. This process
takes place before the server transmits the content to the client. However, in ICN
environment, contents are published before a consumer initiates an access request to
them. Once a content is published, its publisher/owner can hardly keep control of it.
To overcome such issue, an in-depth investigation is carried out on the possibilities of
applying Attribute Based Encryption (ABE) algorithms into content access control
in ICN scenarios.
Based on the research work in Chapter 3 on ABE schemes, one important and
interesting topic is on the delegation capability. Normally, a user in an ABE cryp-
tosystem acquires all of his attribute keys and the global parameters from a Trusted
Third Party (TTP). The TTP is in charge of generating, assigning and managing
attribute keys, which incurs a heavy workload on computation, storage, and com-
munication. Delegation function allows a user to generate keys, for any attribute he
has, for other users. In this way, a delegation-capable user, which is referred to as a
delegator or delegation agent in the rest of this dissertation, is able to off-load some
of the key generation burdens from the TTP. This mechanism has its merits as well as
harms. Existing ABE schemes did not specifically focus on how to control such del-
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egation capability from being maliciously used. However, a uncontrolled delegation
capability is able to create much more risks than the benefits it can gain. Observed
by such fact, this topic is studied in Chapter 4.
Based on the work presented in Chapter 2, 3, and 4, future research directions
are further discussed in Chapter 5. The goal of this chapter is to provide helpful
guidance to continuous work on the three topics presented above. The entire work is
summarized in Chapter 6.
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Chapter 2
ANONYMITY IN MANETS
2.1 Introduction
As discussed before, a powerful traffic monitoring system is able to capture most
of the wireless traffic of a target MANET within a small area. Certain amount of
information can be acquired from the captured traffic generated by individual mobile
nodes.
In Huang (2008), a new approach is proposed to measure the unlinkability for
MANETs based on evidence collected from traffic statistics. This is carried out
by slicing time domain into multiple intervals, so that each node can be either a
sender or a receiver during one such interval. Then a point-to-point traffic matrix
is constructed for each interval, which records the amount of traffic sent from one
node to another. After this step, a traffic-communication relation matrix is created
so that accumulative traffic amount from one node to another can be calculated for
discovering traffic patterns.
This method is effective only when individual nodes can be differentiated without
error. However, localization errors can hardly be avoided or eliminated in practice.
Therefore, how to model network communications when localization errors exist is
crucial for applying the previous work Qin et al. (2014) in practice. This is one of
the major motivations for the work presented here.
Another issue with the previous method is scalability. In large scale networks,
it requires a large amount of resources to generate and store traffic information in
matrices. Based on observations from the application scenarios mentioned above,
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nodes are likely to move in group patterns. Therefore, instead of modeling the com-
munication patterns for individual nodes, the research focus is placed on group-based
communications. In this way, the scalability issue can be reduced and controlled in
the proposed solution.
Following this idea, the proposed work aims to model anonymous communications
using super-nodes. In brief, super-nodes are used to model the formation of node
groups. The proposed approach consists of two steps: (1) In each time interval, all
the nodes are divided into multiple clusters using a novel distance metric proposed
in this work. (2) Super-nodes are generated based on cluster formations in all the
intervals.
The main expected contributions of this work include: (i) Using super-nodes to
solve the issues caused by localization errors. A new approach is presented to gener-
ate super-nodes based on traffic information collected from the target network. (ii)
Proposing a new metric for measuring the distance between nodes and clusters so that
both geographical and communicational factors are used to improve the accuracy of
clustering algorithms.
2.2 Related Work
In this section, detailed information will be provided on the network models,
the traffic monitoring system, and the previous work. The general scenario is that
a MANET consisting of a number of mobile nodes is deployed in an area. Data
transmitted in it is encrypted so that packet contents are well protected. A traffic
monitoring system exists in the area. It consists of a network of passive receivers that
capture signals transmitted in the MANET channel. These receivers are connected
through communication channels that are different from the one used by the target
MANET. Thus, there are no signal interferences between the monitoring system and
9
the target MANET. More details on the network model and the monitoring system
are illustrated below.
2.2.1 Network Model
The communication model of the MANET is based on 802.11b protocol. It can be
extended to other protocols as needed. According to Huang (2008), the transmission
range d of a node has a relation with the data transmission rate r as d ∝ 1
r
. r is
included as part of the Physical Layer Convergence Procedure (PLCP) header, which
is part of 802.11b physical layer, for decoding purpose. Under such model, potential
receivers of a signal can be identified based on the location of the source and its
transmission rate.
Some features in MAC layer can leak useful information to adversarial eaves-
droppers. To mitigate such issue, some settings are changed: (1) Both source and
destination addresses in a frame are set to broadcasting value, i.e. all 1’s. Address-
ing can be handled by upper layers using mechanisms like pairwise shared keys. (2)
Virtual carrier sensing, a.k.a. Network Allocation Vector (NAV), mechanism Sharma
(2003) is disabled. Virtual carrier sensing is used to determine whether the channel
is busy or idle . When a node needs to send out a packet, a Require To Send (RTS)
message is sent out to the authentic receiver. The targeted receiver replies the RTS
message with a Clear To Send (CTS) message if the channel is idle. Both the RTS
and the CTS messages contain information that is used to determine the length of
waiting periods for other nodes to send a message in the same channel. In this way,
only the targeted receiver does not have to wait for a certain length of time to send
out messages. This mechanism is designed to solve collision problem in media access.
However, it exposes point-to-point communication relations to passive eavesdroppers.
Therefore, such option should be disabled in the communication model.
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As mentioned before, nodal movements exhibit group patterns in MANETs. There-
fore, the mobility model of the target MANET is assumed to be group based. But
neither the group size nor the group distribution is publicly known. Single nodes can
be modeled as groups with size of 1.
From above observations, the communication model in MANETs is summarized
as follows:
• Source and destination addresses in MAC frame are set to broadcast value;
• Frame contents are securely protected;
• Upper layer protocols (including network layer routing protocol) are unknown
to attackers;
• Virtual carrier sensing option is disabled;
• Device specification and transmission range of the nodes are known to attackers;
• Nodes’ transmission ranges are not necessarily equal;
• Localization errors are far smaller than transmission ranges;
• Nodes’ movement is group-based.
2.2.2 Traffic Monitoring System
The traffic monitoring system can passively collect traffic information. It is able
to locate the source of a signal with a certain localization error e. Locating a wireless
node based on the Received Signal Strength (RSS) has been proposed and studied for a
long time Faria and Cheriton (2006). It requires collaboration from multiple receivers.
To improve location detection performance, using temporal link signature for location
distinction is proposed in Patwari and Kasera (2007). It constructs temporal link
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signatures using multi-path phenomenon and differentiates node locations based on
normalized link signatures. Using this technique, a node can be located when the
traffic monitoring system receives a signal from it. The traffic monitoring system is
assumed to be able to locate each node in the network as long as it receives a signal
from the node.
Another feature of the traffic monitoring system is to distinguish different types
of hardware. This can be achieved based on research results in radio fingerprinting
Kohno et al. (2005) Rasmussen and Capkun (2007). The idea is that signals from
any two hardware devices are slightly different in terms of timing, frequency, and so
forth, due to the imperfection of manufacturing. However, linking radio fingerprints
with the source’s identity is difficult as the monitoring system is assumed to have very
limited internal knowledge about the target MANET. Thus, the assumption for the
monitoring system is that it can differentiate senders of different signals but cannot
get senders’ identities from such signals. In this way, each node can be represented
by its radio fingerprint but cannot be correlated to its real identity.
The ability of traffic monitoring system can be summarized as:
• Monitoring system can capture all the communication traffic of the MANET;
• Monitoring system does not emit signal in the communication channel of the
MANET;
• Individual nodes can be located with an error e when they send out signals;
• Signals sent from different devices can be distinguished.
2.2.3 Previous Work
The goal of the previous work in Qin et al. (2014) is to measure the anonymity
of end-to-end communication relationships under anonymous communication envi-
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ronments in MANETs. In order to achieve this goal, the time domain is sliced into
multiple intervals (∆t1, ∆t2, . . . , ∆tK). In each interval, a network node can only
be either a message sender or a message receiver. The amount of messages sent from
every node in one interval is stored in a Point-to-Point Traffic Matrix Wi. In this way,
a total number K of such matrices (W1, W2, . . ., WK) are generated. Based on this
collection of information, a series of algorithms are proposed to derive an End-to-End
Traffic Matrix R, which can be used for calculating the source/destination probability
distributions and the end-to-end link probability distribution. However, all this work
is based on the assumption that the information acquired in each Point-to-Point Traf-
fic Matrix is accurate, i.e., the localization errors can be ignored. This assumption
is too strong in practice that the original work could not be widely applied in real
world. To solve this problem, a new approach is proposed in the following section to
cope with the interference from localization errors.
2.3 Proposed Solution
Monitoring and analyzing individual nodes’ communication traffic is desirable but
costly, due to the concerns of computation overhead and control complexity when
network scale is large. In this section, a clustering algorithm is proposed based on the
system model introduced above. It aims to solve two urgent issues with traffic analysis
in MANETs: localization errors and scalability. Localization errors make it impossible
to locate the source of a signal when several nodes are too close to each other. For
example, when the distance between two nodes is less than twice of the localization
error e as shown in Figure 2.1, the monitoring system cannot find out which node
sends out a signal from the overlapping area A. When a group of nodes are moving
together, details such as individual nodes’ communications do not provide much more
useful information than the entire group communication, i.e. communications when
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treating the whole group as one single unit. Therefore, a monitoring system can only
monitor inter-group communications instead. In other words, it ignores inner-group
communications and only focuses on signals transmitted around group borders.
To analyze group communication, it is proposed to divide the nodes into small
groups and treat each individual group as an integrated node, which is called a super-
node. The monitoring system then can focus on communication relations between
super-nodes instead of individual nodes. Nodes that move around by themselves can
be treated as a super-node with size of 1.
A
e
e
Figure 2.1: Localization Error Influence on Traffic Analysis.
To generate super-nodes, the proposed solution follows the idea of slicing time
domain to form multiple time intervals in Qin et al. (2014). In each interval, closely
related nodes are grouped into clusters. The metric for this close relationship is repre-
sented as Distance. Within each interval, the formation of every cluster is considered
to be static. Cluster formation can be different in different intervals. The process
for creating an interval consists of two steps: (1) Take a snapshot of the network
whenever a data packet is captured; (2) Concatenate the snapshots to form a single
interval. The criteria for forming a single interval in step (2) are:
• A super-node can be either a sender or a receiver within one interval, but it
cannot be both;
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• The formation does not change for any cluster within one interval.
Following these criteria, interval lengths are not necessarily equal. Control and
management frames are excluded from triggering a snapshot since they are not closely
related to communication relations. Super-nodes can be generated based on the node
relationship information stored in clusters.
2.3.1 Clustering Algorithm
Before going into details of the clustering algorithm, a summary of notations is
given in Table 2.1.
Unlike traditional agglomerative hierarchical clustering algorithms such as single-
linkage clustering and complete-linkage clustering, a new distance metric is used in
the proposed algorithm. In single-linkage clustering, the distance between the closest
nodes in two clusters is used as the distance metric to determine how close two
clusters are. Clusters are merged recursively. A Proximity Matrix (PM) is used for
merging the closest clusters together. Elements in PM is proportional to the inverse
of linkage criteria metric. That is to say, when the distance between two clusters
is small, the corresponding element value is large. Thus, they are more likely to be
merged in the next round. In the target application scenario, the same metric can
be used because the shortest route between two clusters is likely to include the two
closest nodes in them. However, geographical distance is not sufficient to represent
the relationship between clusters. As stated before, clusters are used to represent the
close relationship between nodes in network. If two nodes are geographically close
while their transmission ranges are too short for them to communicate directly, then
they are not closely related in this interval. (As shown in Figure 2.2A, a third node is
needed to relay their communication.) To the contrary, if two nodes are geographically
distant from each other but the corresponding transmission ranges are long enough
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Table 2.1: Notations
Terms Meaning
Proximity Matrix a matrix for hierarchical clustering
Communication a matrix representing the number of hops
Distance Matrix between individual nodes
Accumulative a matrix representing accumulative average
Distance Matrix distances between individual nodes
Geographical a matrix representing the distances between
Distance Matrix individual nodes
Dendrogram a data structure recording cluster formations
Accumulative a matrix recording cluster formation inform-
Cluster Matrix -ation
Super-node an array recording super-node formation
Formation Array
to make direct communication possible, they are closely related (Figure 2.2B). Based
on this observation, communication distance in hops is included as a factor in the
definition of Distance. Another possible situation is that in one interval the distance
between two clusters may be short for some reason while the overall node formation
history exhibits a distant relationship between these clusters. In this situation, it
is better to assign a longer distance between them for that interval. Following this
idea, it is proposed to modify the distance metric with records from history to better
represent the connections among mobile devices.
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To add communication distance into the metric, the number of hops needs to
be calculated between any two nodes in an interval. Since no information regarding
the routing protocols is known, any shortest path algorithm for directed graph can
be used instead. If one node a locates in another node b’s transmission range as
shown in Figure 2.3A, then there is a directed edge from b to a. The weight assigned
to this edge is one. However, since b is out of a’s transmission range, there is no
directed edge from a to b. When two nodes cannot be connected through a series
of edges, the communication distance is ∞. The communication distance in one
interval is recorded in a matrix called Communication Distance Matrix (CDM) where
CDM(i, j) represents the number of hops between node Ni and Nj.
A B
Figure 2.2: Different Transmission Distances Change Connectivities.
As stated in the network model section, the nodes are moving in group based pat-
terns. If two nodes are closely located to each other in history, they are likely to belong
to the same group. To model this property, a matrix called Accumulative Distance
Matrix (ADM) is defined. In this matrix, each element ADM(i, j) represents the
accumulative average geographical distance between node Ni and node Nj. Initially,
all the elements are set to 0. When a new interval is created, the distances between
nodes in this interval are recorded in a matrix called Geographical Distance Matrix
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a b a1 b1
a2
b2
A B
Figure 2.3: Asymmetric Communication Relations Influence Communication Dis-
tances.
(GDM). GDM represents the closeness among mobile nodes in terms of geographical
distance during the current time interval.
The Distance used in this solution is defined as: Distance(i, j) = αGDM(i, j) +
βADM(i, j) + γCDM(i, j), where α, β, and γ are chosen according to the mobility
of the MANET. Elements of PM are generated and updated following Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 PM Generation and Update
1: In the k-th time interval, each element PM(i, j) = 1/Distance(i, j) ;
2: Update ADM(i, j) = (ADM(i, j) × k + GDM(i, j))/(k + 1), here k starts from
2.
Based on the distance metric and the system assumption, the hierarchical clus-
tering algorithm can be modified as in Algorithm 2. The function Distance(Cs, Ct)
represents the distance under the proposed distance metric between cluster Cs and
cluster Ct, which can be expressed as: Distance(Cs, Ct) = min(Distance(i, j)), Ni ∈
Cs, Nj ∈ Ct. Note that the amount of nodes in different intervals may not be the same
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since some nodes may not emit any signal during one or several intervals. However,
the monitoring system is able to acquire the total number of distinct nodes in network
based on radio fingerprints from all the intervals.
Algorithm 2 Modified Clustering Algorithm
1: Assign: clusters Ci = Ni, i = 1, 2, ...,M ;
// M is the number of nodes in network, Ni denotes the i-th node in network
2: counter c = M ;
3: DO:
4: c = c− 1;
5: Find the nearest clusters Cs and Ct;
6: IF(Distance(Cs, Ct) < (α + β)S(Cs, Ct) + γT
&& |Between(Cs, Ct)| > R)
7: Merge Cs and Ct;
8: ELSE
9: Skip merging Cs and Ct;
10: END-IF-ELSE
11: UNTIL: c == 1.
Here, R is a predefined threshold. Between(Cs, Ct) = {Ni||GeoDistance(Ni, Cs)−
GeoDistance(Ni, Ct)| < δ, |GeoDistance(Ni, Cs)|+|GeoDistance(Ni, Ct)| < }, where
δ and  are predefined thresholds. It returns a set of nodes. Every node in this set
satisfies that the distances between the node itself and the two clusters respectively
are very close. (The difference between the two distances is less than δ.) Meanwhile,
every node is very close to both clusters. (The sum of the two distances is less than
.) The condition |Between(Cs, Ct)| > R makes sure that there are sufficient indi-
vidual nodes scattered between the two clusters when they are merged. When two
distant clusters are connected with a line of sparse nodes, they will not be merged
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(rectangle area in Figure 2.4). S(Cs, Ct) is a conditional function: if no node in Cs
can perform as b in Figure 2.3A to set up a directional one-hop link with any node
in Ct or no node in Ct can do the similar thing, then it returns 0; otherwise, return
the smaller one of the longest directional geographical distances between Cs and Ct.
For instance, if b1 → a1 is the longest one-hop link from any node in Cs to any
node in Ct and a2 → b2 is the longest from Ct to Cs as shown in Figure 2.3B, then
S(Cs, Ct) = min(|b1 → a1|, |a2 → b2|). When the distance between two clusters is
greater than the transmission range of nodes and no intermediate nodes can forward
the traffic, they are not able to establish communications. Therefore, it is meaningless
to merge them together as one single cluster. The threshold T represents an upper
bound on the communication hops between two clusters when merging them. If they
are too far away in hops, then they are not merged as well.
Figure 2.4: Sparse Node Connections Cannot be Used for Merging Clusters.
Outputs from hierarchical clustering algorithms are normally represented in den-
drograms (Figure 2.5). The y axis represents at what distance two clusters are merged.
As in the example of Figure 2.5, y1 is the distance between cluster {A,B} and cluster
{C}. y2 is the distance between cluster {A} and {B}. It is easy to see that {A} and
{B} are closer than either {A} and {C} or {B} and {C}. Dendrograms can accurately
record the hierarchy of cluster generation as the distance grows.
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Figure 2.5: A Dendrogram to Record the Cluster Formations.
2.3.2 Super-node Generation
Clusters constructed from Algorithm 2 cannot be directly used as super-nodes.
This is because in some intervals two or more groups may merge together as one
cluster while in other intervals they are separate. Also, if a node emits a signal in
one interval and keeps silent for several intervals before sending out another signal,
even if it stays in the same group, the cluster formations are changed. Therefore, it
is necessary to extract super-nodes from clusters in multiple time intervals. A matrix
is defined and used to record the frequency that any two nodes locate in the same
cluster. This matrix is called Accumulative Cluster Matrix (ACM). The method for
generating an ACM is illustrated in Algorithm 3. It traverses through all intervals
to record in ACM(j, t) the number of intervals in which two nodes Nj and Nt are
grouped in the same cluster.
Super-node formation can be deduced from ACM. The formation is represented
in an array, which is named Super-node Formation Array (SFA). The method to
create an SFA from ACM is depicted in Algorithm 4. In these algorithms, function
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Cluster(Nj) and Super(Nj) respectively return the cluster and the super-node that
node Nj belongs to. SizeOf returns the amount of nodes in a cluster or a super-node.
Algorithm 3 ACM Generation
1: FOR i = 0; i < K; i+ +
//K is the total number of time intervals
2: FOR j = 0; j < M ; j + +
//M is the amount of nodes in network
3: FOR t = 0; t < M, t 6= j; t+ +
4: IF Cluster(Nj) == Cluster(Nt)
5: ACM(j, t) + +;
6: END-IF
7: END-FOR
8: IF SizeOf(Cluster(Nj)) == 1
9: ACM(j, j) + +;
10: END-IF
11: END-FOR
12: END-FOR
In Algorithm 4, γ and δ are predefined thresholds. γ restricts on the number of
intervals in which any two nodes need to be in the same cluster so that they can be
treated as in the same super-node. δ represents that if a node Nj locates in the same
cluster with Nl for much more time intervals than it locates with any other node in
the network, then it is treated as in the same super-node with Nl. If no such property
exists, a node will be categorized as a super-node of itself.
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2.4 Evaluation
In this section, the proposed approach is evaluated in terms of effectiveness and
complexity. To analyze its effectiveness, the solution is applied in a trace using OM-
NeT++ omn (2013). For complexity analysis, complexity estimations are provided
under the worst case scenario.
In evaluation setup, two moving groups are created with 4 nodes in each group
within an area of 3000 × 3000m2. Every node in a group is moving in the same
direction with the same velocity (10m/s). For simplicity, it’s assumed to have the
same transmission power (100mW ) on all the nodes. The estimated transmission
range is 150m. Two scenarios are chosen for evaluation. In Scenario 1, the groups are
initially located at distant locations and are moving toward each other. In Scenario
2, they initially locate together and then move in opposite directions. These two
scenarios represent typical cases concerning the relationship between two groups:
merger and separation. Other possible moving scenarios between two groups can
be represented by modifying and combining these two scenarios. To test the worst
case on the proposed algorithm, the first criterion for determining the length of an
interval, which relates to packet sending, is disabled during the entire process. Thus,
fewer intervals are created. A single interval, instead of multiple intervals, is used
to represent the fact that nodes stay in their respective groups for a long period of
time. However, the proposed approach is able to overcome this problem by setting
the value γ in Algorithm 4.
Evaluation results show that the proposed approach can successfully generate two
super-nodes corresponding to the two groups respectively. The minimum number of
time intervals needed for Scenario 1 is 1. This is because initially two groups are
separate. During the first interval, the clustering algorithm can easily generate one
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cluster for each group. As the groups are merging, cluster formations in the following
intervals do not provide more accurate information than the first interval until they
are completely separated. For Scenario 2, the minimum number of time intervals
needed is 5. At interval 5, the two groups separate from each other completely
and the condition in line 6 of algorithm 4 is satisfied. At this moment, the cluster
formation correctly represents the group formation.
Additionally, the percentage that correct clusters are generated hierarchically in
each interval using the geographical distance and the proposed distance metric are
calculated respectively for Scenario 1. A cluster is correct if all its members belong
to the same group. The results are shown in Figure 2.6. As shown in the graph, only
two intervals are generated using the proposed metric. If Algorithm 4 is not used to
integrate the cluster formation in different intervals together, it is almost impossible
to infer the group formation solely based on the cluster formation in a single interval
in Scenario 1 since the correct cluster ratio is less than 90% in 3 out of 7 intervals.
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Figure 2.6: The Correct Cluster Ratios are Different using Different Metrics.
For complexity evaluation, the worst case scenario is the geographical position and
the transmission coverage area of every node change during every interval. Therefore,
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all the data stored in the matrices need to be updated. If M is used to denote the
amount of nodes in network and K as the amount of intervals, the complexity for
calculating GDM is O(M2). The number of ADM update operations is also O(M2).
CDM can be calculated using Johnson’s algorithm Johnson (1977) in O(M2 logM).
The complexity of Between() function is less than O(M2). This is because the worst
case is that the number of nodes left between two clusters is at the same order as M
while the size of the two clusters are at the same order as well. Thus, the cost for
Algorithm 2 is O(M3 logM). The complexity of Algorithm 3 and Algorithm 4 are
O(M2K) and O(M2) respectively.
It is clear that Algorithm 2 is the most complex algorithm. Considering normal
hierarchical clustering algorithms have a complexity of O(M3), the proposed solu-
tion provides an effective modeling method without greatly increasing the overall
complexity.
2.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, it is proposed to solve the problem of localization errors and the
scalability issue with traffic analysis in MANETs by using super-nodes. Super-nodes
are used to recover the group formation of network nodes. By slicing the time domain
and grouping the nodes in each interval, information about geographical location and
communication distance is recorded in clusters. Super-nodes are generated based on
this information to represent the closeness between nodes. The proposed method
provides an accurate approach for modeling MANET communication relations with
a polynomial complexity.
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Algorithm 4 SFA Generation
1: FOR j = 0; j < M ; j + +
//M is the amount of nodes in network
2: IF Super(Nj) == NULL
3: Create a super-node for Nj;
4: END-IF
5: FOR t = 0; t < M, t 6= j; t+ +
6: IF ACM(j, t) > γK
//K is the total number of time intervals
7: Add Nt to Super(Nj);
//So that Super(Nt) == Super(Nj)
8: Set Nt.P rocessed = True;
9: END-IF
10: END-FOR
11: END-FOR
12: FOR j = 0; j < M ; j + +
13: IF Nj.P rocessed! = True
14: Set l s.t. ACM(j, l) = MAX(ACM(j, t)), 1 ≤ t ≤ N ;
15: Set h s.t. ACM(j, h) = MAX(ACM(j, t′)), 1 ≤ t′ ≤ N, t′ 6= l;
16: IF ACM(j, l)− ACM(j, h) > δ
17: Add Nj to Super(Nl);
18: ELSE
19: Create a super-node for Nj;
20: END-IF-ELSE
21: END-IF
22: END-FOR
26
Chapter 3
ATTRIBUTE-BASED ACCESS CONTROL IN MOBILE ICN
3.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter, the relation anonymity issue is discussed in MANET.
In such traditional networking schemes, if a network entity wants to access some
information content, it has to locate and connect to the server that provides such
service following network routing protocols. As a result, the information is tightly
associated with the location of the server. The entire network is centered around the
connections between content consumers and content providers, making connection
status an important factor to the network.
Witnessed by the fact that most of the network traffic is video sharing Cisco
(2015), various ICN architectures Carzaniga et al. (2004); Koponen et al. (2007);
Dannewitz et al. (2010); Fotiou et al. (2012b); named data (2015) are proposed. In
ICN architecture, the core of networking is shifted from consumer-server connections
to consumer-content connections. In this way, instead of identifying content owners’
addresses, the network changes to identify authentic content copies scattered in net-
work. Consumers do not need to know where copies of a content are located, i.e.
the IP addresses of content owners. Content names are used to direct consumers to
content copies. Content owners publish contents, which can be copied and distributed
all over the network using network caches Psaras et al. (2012); Sun et al. (2014). Net-
work caches are normally servers that are specifically designed for storage purpose or
normal network entities with limited storage capabilities. This design enables con-
tents being efficiently delivered to consumers with a higher efficiency. For example,
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it is able to retrieve the nearest (according to some metrics) copy of a content to a
consumer. In contrast, in the traditional Internet networking framework, a consumer
gets a content only from its original owner.
Though the design of ICN is efficient in retrieving contents, it brings great chal-
lenges to security issues during content caching and retrieving. One of them is that
traditional access control mechanisms cannot be easily enforced in such environment.
This is because, in ICN, content owners and consumers are not directly connected.
Content owners have no control over the distributed network caches. To enforce access
control to the content, several frameworks have been proposed Fotiou et al. (2012a);
Singh (2012). Most of them require additional authorities or secure communication
channels in network to authenticate each content consumer. These schemes are sound
but have too much reliance on traditional control schemes, making them inefficient in
practice, especially in mobile ICN environment. Therefore, instead of enforcing the
data access control mechanism on each caching server, a natural approach is to secure
the content by enforcing the data access control through cryptographic approaches.
If designed properly, only legitimate users who have proper cryptographic keys are
able to access the data content. As each content is identified by the content name, it
is easy for any network entity to access the content as long as such name is consistent
among all the copies of the same content.
In this chapter, an attribute-based access control for ICN naming scheme is pro-
posed. In this scheme, attributes defined by different authorities can be synchronized
more efficiently than traditional approaches. Content consumers do not need to ne-
gotiate their attribute keys when they request contents from other authorities. To
facilitate the application in mobile environment, the proposed approach aims to re-
duce the burden of a Trusted Third Party (TTP) and distribute part of its duties to
several distributed attribute authorities.
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The core of the proposed solution is an ABE-based naming scheme. This ap-
proach is inspired by Attribute Based Encryption (ABE) schemes Bethencourt et al.
(2007); Yu et al. (2008); Lewko and Waters (2011). Instead of incorporating a set of
additional components, it only requires one additional trusted third party (TTP) in
the network. In addition, it can be seamlessly incorporated into existing flat-name
ICN architectures. In the proposed approach, each network entity is assigned with a
set of attributes with the help of a TTP according to their real identities. The access
control policy for the content is based on combinations of the attributes in terms of
AND and OR operations. This policy is enforced according to the content names
instead of the contents. Moreover, privacy-preservation is provided for the content
access policies , i.e., only legitimated content consumers are able to get part of the
encryption policies and decrypt the data content. This feature can greatly improve
the privacy protection on ICN data when they are distributed in the public domain.
Especially, in wireless network, an access policy without privacy-preservation can be
easily captured and monitored by any passive adversaries eavesdropping on the wire-
less channels. The proposed approach also provides a user with the capability to
identify its eligibility of the accessed contents through the encrypted names before
actually accessing and processing the data content. To further support the use of
ontology in attribute management, the proposed scheme enables comparison between
attributes, which gives the capability to rank attributes and associate different privi-
leges accordingly. In summary, the expected contributions of this work can be listed
as follows:
• It enables attribute rankings and access privilege management, making it flexi-
ble to construct a data access policy in real-world scenario. The content access
policy is confidentially preserved. Ineligible consumers cannot derive the data
access policies even if they collude together;
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• It proposes a naming scheme for ICN network which combines the flexible at-
tribute management solution with the privacy preserving access policy;
• It significantly reduces the computation and communication overhead for a
potential consumer to determine his eligibility to access the content.
3.2 Related Work
In this chapter, an ABE-based scheme is proposed to enforce a secure access con-
trol mechanism in ICN network. Before introducing details of the proposed approach,
related research results on ICN and ABE are presented respectively.
3.2.1 ICN Solutions
Several ICN architectures have been proposed in the past years. Although these
approaches are different from each other in several aspects, the main idea is centered
on information processing and management. Combined Broadcast and Content Based
(CBCB) Routing Carzaniga et al. (2004) is a solution that runs on the application
layer. It uses publish/subscribe scheme to publish contents. Each consumer broad-
casts its interest in the form of attribute combinations. These interests are propagated
through the network. At each router, the interests associated with an interface are
updated in the form of predicates. When content is transferred through the network,
the content is compared with the predicates on every interface to determine through
which interfaces to forward the content.
Data Oriented Network Architecture (DONA) Koponen et al. (2007) is deployed
above IP layer. The name of a content is in the form of P : L, where P represents the
hash of the owner’s public key, L is a unique label the owner assigns to the content.
The owner registers the content into the name resolution system when it is ready to
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publish. Consumers use the name resolution system to find the nearest copy of the
content. The system returns with the content copy or the IP address of the content
location. Network of Information (NetInf) Dannewitz et al. (2010) follows a similar
naming scheme as DONA. But instead of using the owner’s public key to generate
the digest, it uses a separate pair of public/private keys for the content. Multi-
level Distributed Hash Table (DHT) is used for name resolution purpose. A content
owner needs to register its content in all the three levels of the DHT and content
lookups are carried out from the lowest level upwards. If it is not successful, then
a dedicated resolution system will be used for further assistance. Publish Subscribe
Internet Technologies (PURSUIT) Fotiou et al. (2012b) is another solution that uses
a similar naming scheme as DONA. However, it has a much different structure for
retrieving content locations, which involves topology information and load balance.
Besides, it uses Bloom filter for source oriented routing to forward content copies to
the consumers.
Named Data Networking (NDN) named data (2015) doesn’t specifically define the
name structure. A name in NDN consists of multiple components, each of which can
be a human-readable string or a digest of the content. Content providers are required
to guarantee the uniqueness of name components. This solution uses names to execute
a routing process that is similar to the current IP-based routing. Name tables, which
are similar to route tables in IP network, maintain the prefix of names and the
corresponding interfaces or data. In this way, a response to a content request can be
the content itself. Also, this solution aims to provide a replacement to IP instead of
being a layer above IP, which is different from approaches mentioned before.
Several research works have been conducted on applying NDN in mobile network
environment. In Angius et al. (2012), the authors proposed a gossip algorithm to
disseminate messages with a minimum number of transmissions. It is based on a
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modification from traditional NDN solution. In Yu-Ting et al. (2014), a dedicated
network architecture for mobile ad hoc ICN network is proposed. It supports both
pull and push transport in multi-hop communications. Existing mobile ICN research
works are mainly focused on lower-level networking mechanisms. For upper-level
mechanisms, access control as an example, there is not much difference between a
traditional ICN and a mobile ICN, except for the underlying networking related fac-
tors, such as mobility and mobility-related delay.
All these ICN solutions focus on the efficiency and security aspects of the network
while access control to content and content privacy are not well addressed. In Fotiou
et al. (2012a), an independent access control system is introduced to support the
need in ICN. This system connects to the ICN structure through a component called
the Relaying Party (RP). An additional component called Access Control Provider
(ACP) is in charge of creating access policies and enforcing the policies to consumers’
credentials. This system incorporates access control into ICN systems, but requires
much more network interactions for a consumer to get the content. For content
privacy purposes, Arianfar et al. (2011) proposed a design in which each file is divided
into blocks. A block from the file is mixed with blocks from “cover” content using
randomizing transformations and the generated mixture is published to the network.
In this way, adversaries could not retrieve the original file easily. To recover the file,
an authentic consumer needs to get more information related to the file from a secure
channel. With such information, the consumer requests related chunks from the
network to generate the original file. This approach meets the security and privacy
requirement to some extent, but through a complicated process. The requirement for
a secure channel is very difficult to satisfy in many ICN application scenarios.
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3.2.2 ABE Schemes
ABE schemes originate from Identity-Based Encryption (IBE), which aims to use
the user’s id as the public key for asymmetric encryptions. After that, an ABE scheme
named Ciphertext-Policy ABE (CP-ABE) Bethencourt et al. (2007) was introduced
by J. Bethencourt et al. This scheme assigns each user with a set of attributes ac-
cording to their real-life identities and roles. There is one private key component
corresponding to each attribute for each user. A policy specifying under what con-
ditions the ciphertext can be successfully decrypted is constructed by the encryptor.
This policy is transmitted together with the ciphertext, but in plaintext form. In other
words, it is exposed to the network channel. Users who do not possess a satisfactory
combination of attributes are not able to decrypt the ciphertext. This scheme enables
providing access control to individual messages. A content owner is able to specify
the required attribute combinations without knowing the receivers’ key credentials.
In addition, this scheme is secure against collusion attackers.
The original CP-ABE scheme is a possible candidate for enforcing access control
in ICN, but it is not a good solution in such scenarios. The reason why CP-ABE is
not suitable for ICN usage is that the policy is transmitted in clear text. In traditional
network, a user is authenticated before access is granted. However, once a content is
published in ICN, the owner has no control on it. In this way, any network user who
has access to the ciphertext is able to access the policy. Attackers can deduce the
sensitivity of the message as well as inferring the identities of those who are involved
in the message transmission. For example, a message encrypted with the policy
{Chairman}AND {CEO} from a hospital is highly likely to be more important and
valuable than a message with policy {Nurse}AND {Intern}. Thus, attackers can
easily identify the high-value users and concentrate attacks of different forms on them.
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What is needed for CP-ABE is the capability to hide the policy into the ciphertext.
For such purpose, several works Yu et al. (2008); Nishide et al. (2008) are proposed.
An attacker cannot get any information about the policy even if it actually executes
the decryption process. However, these solutions sacrifice efficiency for security in
that any party that tries to decrypt the ciphertext will have to go through the entire
decryption process which involves a heavy computation overhead. For instance, in Yu
et al. (2008), the decryption process includes a bit-by-bit decryption for the decrypting
party’s ID.
To save computation resources for the unsatisfactory users, D. Huang et al. pro-
posed a scheme Huang et al. (2010) to expose the policy attributes step by step. Only
one attribute is exposed to the decrypter at one step. In this way, the decrypter is
able to stop the decryption process as soon as it fails at a specific step. However, the
price for such a feature is that one additional attribute, which is the one that fails the
decrypter, is exposed. Besides, this approach supports AND-gates only, which limits
the flexibility of the policy.
For attribute management purpose, it is desirable to enable the comparison be-
tween attributes so that nominal attributes can be mapped into ordinal values, e.g.
{Nurse} < {Physician}. In Zhu et al. (2012); Wang et al. (2015), Y. Zhu et al.
proposed an encryption scheme using interval comparisons based on bilinear map-
pings. In this chapter, the idea for interval comparisons is adopted and applied to
hidden-policy attribute based encryption algorithms.
Comparatively, the proposed scheme achieves better flexibility by allowing the use
of OR gates, and fully preserves the attribute policy in that ineligible nodes cannot
get any information on any attribute in the policy that they do not have.
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3.3 System and Models
In this section, a basic medical ICN framework, an overview of the attribute-based
naming and access control model proposed in the rest of the chapter, and the attack
model are presented. A preliminary mathematical description of CP-ABE scheme is
also provided.
3.3.1 Application Scenario
In a typical ICN system, there are three roles: content owner, content consumer
and content cache. A content owner creates the content and publishes it into the
network. A consumer is a network entity that requests for the content. It gets the
content with the help of the ICN infrastructure. A cache is an entity that keeps a
copy of the content for a period of time in its own local storage so that whenever a
request for the same content arrives, it directly responds to the request with a copy
of the content to the consumer. All these three network roles are exchangeable for
individual network entities. That is to say, a network entity can simultaneously be a
publisher, a consumer and a cache for different contents. In the following, an example
in medical care is used through out the rest of this chapter to show how the proposed
scheme works. As shown in Figure 3.1, the content owner can be a Patient, a content
consumer can be a Nurse or a Physician, and the content caches are servers storing
encrypted contents.
In an ICN network, users get content names from a Name Searching Service (NSS)
and use the names to get the content through a Name-based Routing (NR) system.
A user gets content names from the NSS and the NR is able to retrieve the content
based on the names. Details on how these two systems are implemented is out of the
focus of this work. Interested readers can refer to Koponen et al. (2007), named data
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(2015), and Carzaniga et al. (2004) for more information. Additionally, the proposed
model includes a Trusted Third Party (TTP) that sets up Attribute-Based Access
Control (ABAC) and Attribute-Based Encryption (ABE) related public parameters
for the network. It also helps assigning and managing attributes to entities.
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Figure 3.1: Basic ICN System Model.
In the proposed scheme, every network entity is associated with a unique identifier
(UID) and a set of attributes. UID itself can be treated as a special attribute. A
TTP is in charge of setting up global parameters for the entire network. An attribute
(other than UIDs) can be defined and managed by any entity in network. But the
definition and management process on an attribute should be carried out by the same
entity. This entity is denoted as the authority of that attribute. As in this example,
the attributes include: {HospitalA,Nurse, Physician, Cardiologist,MRI}. In the
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proposed network model, multiple attribute authorities can be present at the same
time. Thus, not only all the network users are organized in a distributed manner, the
attribute authorities are also distributed. This property is supported by the specially-
designed naming scheme proposed in this chapter. Each of the authorities is in charge
of an independent and non-overlapping set of attributes.
A content owner is able to set up an access policy for its content under this scheme.
The policy is represented as a combination of related attributes with AND and OR
gates. For example, if a content owner wants to create a file that should be accessible
only to people working as a Physician or as a Nurse at Hospital A, then the policy
could be {A}AND {{Physician}OR {Nurse}}. In this way, the owner does not
need to know explicitly who should access the content. He can identify the attributes
and the combination so that as long as a consumer satisfies the policy, he is able to
access the content. Any entity that does not satisfy the policy will not be able to
access the data in this content.
3.3.2 Attribute-based Naming and Access Control
Attributes in an ICN network can be categorized into subject attributes and ob-
ject attributes. As shown in Figure 3.1, attributes in green are subject attributes
while the red attributes are object attributes of the report. When they are used in
ICN, there are some relations between the subject attributes and object attributes.
For example, {Cardiology} and {Cardiologist} are a subject attribute and an ob-
ject attribute, respectively. They can be treated as equal since a cardiologist is
assumed to always work on cardiology. Another example is {MRI}. As a useful tool,
several medical subjects make use of MRI for diagnosis, such as neurology, cardiol-
ogy, and oncology. To model such relationship, {Neurology, Cardiology,Oncology}
are defined as sub-attributes of {MRI}. When a content owner publishes the con-
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tent, he decides which attributes are used for access control and which are for con-
tent search and content description. They are denoted as Access Control Attributes
(ACAs) and Descriptive Attributes (DAs), respectively. As in the example of Fig. 3.1,
{Hospital A, Physician,MRI,Cardiology} are used as ACAs. {Patient x,Report}
are used as DAs. Thus, network entities only see that this content is a report of Pa-
tient x as the DAs are publicly search-able. The decision on ACA/DA classification
is crucial to the privacy of the protected content and it’s up to the content owner to
make such decisions.
3.3.3 Comparable Attributes and Attribute Rankings
In addition to the above-mentioned attribute setups, comparison between at-
tributes is also supported. To illustrate this property, the example policy in 3.3.1,
{A}AND {{Physician}OR {Nurse}}, is used. If for some reason, a modification
to the policy is needed as: all the staff working at hospital A that rank higher than
nurse are allowed to access the file, then in the traditional approach, it is neces-
sary to enumerate all the attributes that are allowed and construct a very complex
policy as {A}AND {{Physician}OR {Nurse}OR ...}. However, if a comparison re-
lationship is set up between Physician and Nurse as Physician > Nurse, meaning
that a Physician attribute includes all the privileges of a Nurse attribute but with
more that are not possessed by Nurse, then the original policy can be simplified.
Suppose such a comparison relationship has been established with all the related oc-
cupation roles, then {A}AND {{Physician}OR {Nurse}OR ...} can be reduced to
{A}AND {Nurse}, which is easier for management purpose.
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An Illustrative Example
In the example of Fig. 3.1, there are three subjects: a Nurse, a Physician, and a
Patient. Their attributes are as shown in the figure. The patient publishes his MRI
report in the network as the content. He, as the content owner, specifies an access
policy as shown in Fig. 3.2 for the MRI report. Its object attributes are listed in
Fig. 3.1. The content name is created following the procedure in Fig. 3.3, which will
be further illustrated in Section 3.4.1. When the nurse tries to access this content,
she can successfully use her {Hospital A} attribute to decrypt the first node but
will get stuck at {Physician}, meaning this content is not prepared for her. When
the Physician accesses the content, she can successfully decrypt the entire decryption
process from the leaf to the root level-by-level to reveal the random data encrypting
key. Here, {MRI} is substituted with {Cardiology} since {Cardiology} is a sub-
attribute. This is shown with the arrow in Fig. 3.2. Also, {Cardiology} equals
to {Cardiologist} in this case. Then, the Physician uses the NR system to get the
nearest copy of the content and uses the random data encrypting key derived from
the name to decrypt the MRI report.
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Figure 3.2: Creating a Content Name.
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3.3.4 Attack Model
In order to guarantee the integrity of content, a digital digest signed by its owner
is included in the content meta-data. Since data integrity is not the focus of this
chapter, detailed information on this subject will not be provided. An attacker to the
proposed system is assumed to focus on the proposed ABE scheme.
In the rest of this chapter, the attackers are assumed to have two primary goals
in compromising the ICN access control scheme:
• acquiring unauthorized privilege to the data protected under the proposed ABE
scheme;
• retrieving constitutional information of access policies to gain more information
about the content, the owner, and the consumers. In other words, breaking the
protection on the policies.
Sensitive information in this context includes but is not limited to the identity
of the owner or consumers, the sensitivity of the content and the potential value of
data in the content. For the first goal, attackers have to break the confidentiality
mechanism of the protected data. Feasible methods include collusion attacks and
vulnerability exploitation. The second attack goal is less important to an attacking
party as a successful attack does not reveal information directly related to the pro-
tected secret. For the second goal, attackers need to analyze the proposed ABE-based
scheme to identify possible ways to reveal the policy.
3.3.5 Preliminaries of ABE
The foundation of ABE-type algorithms is bilinear pairing computation. In this
chapter, the design from Zhu et al. (2012) is adopted in terms of algebraic structure.
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Suppose there are two groups: an additive group G0 and a multiplicative group G1
with a same order n = sp′q′, where p′ and q′ are two large prime numbers. A bilinear
map is defined as e : G0 ×G0 → G1 . This map has three properties:
• Bilinearity: e(aP, bQ) = e(P,Q)ab, for any P,Q ∈ G0 and a, b ∈ Zp;
• Nondegeneracy: e(g, h) 6= 1, where g and h are generators of G0;
• Efficiency: Computing the pairing can be efficiently achieved.
In CP-ABE, there are three types of keys: master key, public key and private
key. A TTP is required to generate a set of public parameters and securely store
the master key. The TTP will not be involved in the network communication. It
can be offline all the time. The scheme of CP-ABE consists of four basic algorithms:
Setup, Encrypt, KeyGen and Decrypt. In Setup, the TTP chooses two random
exponents α, β ∈ Zp. A public key is formatted as < G0, g, h, f, e(g, g)α > while the
master key is (β, gα). Here h = gβ, f = g
1
β . The public key is published by the
TTP before deployment. When a party wants to encrypt a message M , it runs the
Encrypt algorithm. The inputs of this algorithm are the public key, the message M
and a policy tree T . The output is a ciphertext. The KeyGen algorithm is used
to generate private keys based on its inputs: the master key and a set of attributes.
For each network node, the TTP runs the KeyGen algorithm once to generate a
private key according to attributes assigned to that node. When a node receives the
ciphertext, it runs the Decrypt algorithm to get the encrypted data. This algorithm
takes the ciphertext and the node’s private keys as inputs.
In traditional CP-ABE schemes, the TTP is involved in both when a node joins
in the system (node management) and when an attribute is created and assigned to
a node (attribute management). When the scale of the system is large, the TTP will
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turn to a bottleneck for performance concerns. For this purpose, the proposed scheme
aims to isolate the duty of node management and attribute management. It off-loads
the attribute management functions to other entities.
3.4 ABE-based ICN Naming Scheme
In this section, the detailed design for the proposed ABE-based naming scheme
in ICN network is illustrated. This scheme is based on a previous work Huang et al.
(2010); Li et al. (2013).
3.4.1 Creating a Content
Initially, the TTP sets up global parameters for the entire network. Then, any
entity in network can create attributes and assign them to other entities. Detailed
process on how attributes are distributed is out of the scope of this work. Interested
readers can refer to attribute allocation problem solutions for large scale networks
such as Biswas et al. (2006). Once the attributes are assigned, network entities are
able to create contents, i.e. start network communications. As shown in Fig. 3.3,
when an entity publishes a file, as the content owner, it creates an access policy for
the content. The policy is represented as a combination of related attributes with
AND and OR gates. For example, if a content owner wants to create a record that
is accessible only to physicians and nurses working at hospital A, the policy can be
constructed as: {A}AND {{Physician}OR {Nurse}}. In this way, content owners
do not need to know explicitly who should access the content before constructing the
policy. Instead, all they need to do is to identify the attributes and the combinations
of attributes for a qualified content user so that as long as a consumer satisfies the
policy, it is able to access the content. Any entity who does not satisfy the policy will
automatically be deprived of the privilege to access the information in this content.
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No additional network participants are needed during this entire process to monitor
the access control enforcement.
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Figure 3.3: Creating a Content.
After creating the policy, the owner generates a random data encrypting key and
uses it to encrypt the file. This encryption process can be any type of cryptosystem,
the choice of which is not directly related to the proposed scheme. The encryption
result is set as the data part of the content item. The meta-data part includes public
parameters used for data integrity assurance and data decryption, like the type of
cryptosystem used for the random data encrypting key.
The content owner creates a name for the content. He uses the proposed scheme
to encrypt the random key under the policy he has specified. The result is used as
the content name. Here, it is necessary to emphasize that the generated name hides
the content access policies so that no one can get the entire policy from the name.
In fact, the content name is a ciphertext after a series of encryption operations. It
exhibits as a random sequence of bits to any viewer.
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A consumer who needs this file is able to get a copy of the content by its name
through the ICN network. Before he retrieves the content, he can use his own at-
tributes to decrypt the name. If his attributes satisfy the hidden policy embedded in
the name, he can get the random data-encrypting key protected in the name. The
data of the content then can be decrypted using the random key to recover the orig-
inal file. If a consumer cannot successfully decrypt the content name, it implies the
consumer is not allowed to access the original file. Thus, even if he downloads the
content, he still does not have the random data encrypting key to decrypt it. A ben-
efit of the propose scheme is that a normal user can delay the downloading process
of the content till he successfully decrypts the content name, which helps reduce the
workload of underlying network.
3.4.2 ABE-based Naming Scheme
In this section, a composite order group G0 with an order n = p
2q2 is used, where p
and q are two large prime numbers. In other words, the composite value s in Section
3.3.5 is set to pq. Two subgroups Gs and Gt of G0 are chosen such that s = pq,
t = pq, and Gs is orthogonal to Gt. Such composite-order group configuration is
deliberately configured mainly because the proposed scheme is designed to support
attribute rankings in Gs. The core idea of such configuration follows RSA conditions
to enforce one-direction deduction between attribute values. This is why the value of
s and t are set to be products of two large prime numbers. Details on such process
will be illustrated in Section 3.4.3.
Attributes of an entity can be any value in strings. In CP-ABE, these values are
converted into mathematical values by hash functions. In the proposed scheme, each
attribute string Ai corresponds to a triplet (Ii, ki, hi), where Ii, ki, hi ∈ Z∗n′ . Si and
Ti in Algorithm 7 are assigned by the TTP. Their values are determined by the
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generators under each sub-group and the value of hi. The mapping from a string to
such a three-tuple is determined by the authority of attribute Ai. An access policy can
be expressed in Disjunctive Normal Form (DNF) of attributes. In each conjunctive
clause of the DNF, the sequence of attributes is determined by the encrypting party,
i.e. the content owner. The sequence of encrypting a conjunctive clause (encryption
sequence) is opposite to the decryption sequence. To help identify the decryption
thread, a public attribute APub is defined in the scheme. Unlike other attributes,
APub is associated with a triplet (SPub, TPub, IPub), which are publicly known. For each
conjunctive clause, the encryptor adds APub at the end of the encryption sequence.
In other words, the special attribute APub is always the last attribute in encryption
and the first attribute in decryption process. Additionally, the encryptor is required
to simplify the DNF so as to reduce the size of attribute policy.
In the proposed scheme, a GlobalSetup algorithm is run by the TTP to generate
global parameters for the system. For each node joining in the network, the TTP runs
NodeJoin algorithm once to generate a unique secret for the node. The input of
NodeJoin is the node’s UID and the outputs are {DUID, XPub,UID, YPub, ZPub,UID}.
For each attribute, the authority in charge runs the AuthoritySetup algorithm to
generate secrets associated with that attribute. Besides, this naming scheme includes
three more basic algorithms: KeyGen, Encrypt, and Decrypt. Once set up, the
authority of an attribute runs KeyGen for each node carrying this attribute to
allocate the inherent attribute secrets. Encrypt and Decrypt are used by encryptors
and decrypters respectively for message processing.
The GlobalSetup algorithm generates global parameters {Gs, Gt, ϕ, ψ, ϕβ,
e(ϕ, ψ)α, Enck(·), Deck(·), (PPub, SPub, TPub), ROOT}, and global secrets {β, gα},
where α and β are random values and Enck(·), Deck(·) are a pair of symmetric
encryption/decryption functions.
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Algorithm 5 GlobalSetup
1: Choose two bilinear groups G0 and G1 with a composite order n = p2q2, where p
and q are two large prime numbers. g is the generator of G0;
2: Choose two subgroups Gs and Gt of G0 such that: the order of Gs and Gt are
both n′ = pq; Gs and Gt are orthogonal to each other;
3: Choose two generators ϕ ∈ Gs and ψ ∈ Gt;
4: Choose two random values α, β ∈ Z∗n′ ;
5: Define a constant ROOT ∈ G1 as identification of the secret message;
6: Choose a pair of symmetric encryption functions Enck(·) and Deck(·) in G1;
7: Define a public attribute, (SPub, TPub, IPub), SPub ∈ Gs, TPub ∈ Gt, IPub ∈ Z∗n′ ;
8: The global parameters are {Gs, Gt, ϕ, ψ, ϕβ, e(ϕ, ψ)α, Enck(·), Deck(·),
(SPub, TPub, IPub), ROOT}, global secrets are {β, ψα}.
The NodeJoin algorithm is defined as in Algorithm 6.
Each individual authority that manages an attribute Ai will have to run Author-
itySetup to set up attribute secrets.
The KeyGen algorithm generates private keys corresponding to each attribute
for each node holding this attribute. It is defined in Algorithm 8. When the node
receives keys from the authority, it checks if LPUIDUID = TPub is true. If it’s true, it
updates PUID with P
2
UID and accepts the keys. This update is intended to defend
against replay attack on LUID. If not true, it will discard the keys.
The Encrypt algorithm works following the encryption sequence of each clause.
In the following, each attribute is denoted from I1 to Im, m is the number of at-
tributes in the clause. In the example of Fig. 3.2, I1 = MRI, I2 = Physician,
I3 = Hospital A, I4 = APub, m = 4. Any encryptor needs to choose a random value
s ∈ Zp, set I0 = s and follow Algorithm 9.
46
Algorithm 6 NodeJoin
1: For each node with UID in network, generate a random number rUID ∈ Z∗n′ ;
2: Calculate DUID = ψ
(α+rUID)/β;
3: Calculate:
XPub,UID = ϕ
rUIDSrPubPub ,
YPub = ϕ
rPub ,
ZPub,UID = e(ϕ, ψ)
rUIDIPub .
where rPub ∈ Z∗n′ is a random number for each node;
4: Choose a random value PUID ∈ Z∗n′ ;
5: Assign to the node {DUID, XPub,UID, YPub, ZPub,UID, PUID}.
Algorithm 7 AuthoritySetup
1: For each attribute Ai, choose random numbers Ii, ki, hi ∈ Z∗n′ ;
2: For each attribute Ai, generate Si ∈ Gs and Ti ∈ Gt, where Si = ϕhi and Ti = ψhi .
The Decrypt algorithm works following the decryption sequence. Note that the
first attribute in decryption sequence is always APub. A decryption process follows
Algorithm 10.
When Decrypt algorithm succeeds, Sk is the random data encyrpting key em-
bedded in C.
3.4.3 Attribute Rankings
The proposed ABE scheme extends capabilities of traditional ABE schemes and
is able to support comparison between values of the same attribute. In real world
scenario, this means, for instance, two attribute values Physician and Nurse of at-
tribute Occupation can be compared and have the relationship Physician > Nurse.
In other words, it means that the Physician attribute subsumes all the privileges
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Algorithm 8 KeyGen
1: The authority passes Ii, Si and Ti to TTP;
2: TTP computes and sends back to the authority:
Xi,UID = ϕ
rUIDSrii ,
Yi = ϕ
ri ,
Zi,UID = e(ϕ, ψ)
rUIDIi ,
LUID = T
1/PUID
Pub .
where ri ∈ Z∗n′ is a random number;
3: The authority assigns Xi,UID, Yi, Zi,UID, and LUID to the node together with Ii,
hi and ki.
the Nurse has, but the Nurse does not have any of the additional privileges the
Physician has. Such capability is applicable and desirable when the privilege of the
lower-ranking role (Nurse) is a subset of that of the higher-ranking role (Physician).
In traditional ABE solutions, each attribute value (Physician and Nurse in the above
example) corresponds to a set of cryptographic components that are designated for
that specific attribute (Occupation in the example) of a specific user. Components
for different values of the same attribute are not related. In other words, the key
components of Physician are independent to those of Nurse. To establish rank-
ing relations between attribute values, certain connections need to be established
between the corresponding key components. Specifically, a one-direction relation be-
tween values of the same attribute is supported in the proposed scheme. It allows a
higher-ranking user (Physician) to be able to legally derive the corresponding lower-
ranking role (Nurse) key components for himself. However, the lower-ranking role
cannot derive anything useful regarding the higher-ranking role.
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Algorithm 9 Encrypt
1: Calculate C = Ke(ϕ, ψ)αs, C ′ = ϕβs and C ′′ = EncK(ROOT );
2: For each attribute An, if a triplet (C1,n, C2,n, C3,n) has already been calculated,
move to the next attribute An+1 and restart step 3 with An+1; else, goto step 4;
3: Choose a random number ln ∈ Z∗n′ ;
4: Calculate:
C1,n = ψ
(In−1−In)ln ,
C2,n = T
(In−1−In)ln
n ,
C3,n = (knln)
−1.
1 ≤ n ≤ m;
5: Calculate C1,m+1 = ψ
(Im−IPub), C2,m+1 = T
(Im−IPub)
Pub .
Such capability can be achieved by deliberately assigning appropriate values in
KeyGen algorithm. Specifically, as in the previous example, the scheme assigns hP
for Physician and hN for Nurse such that hP = h
αP , hN = h
αN , h ∈ Z∗n′ , and
αP < αN . Thus, it is easy to derive SP = ϕ
hP and SN = ϕ
hN . This is different
from traditional ABE scheme, where both SP and SN are randomly chosen. Such
difference is the connection that is established between comparable values (Physician
and Nurse) of the same attribute (Occupation).
Recall when the order of Gs is defined, it is written as n′ = pq, where p and q are
two large prime numbers. In other words, n′ is a composite number satisfying RSA
algorithm requirements. If a user UP is assigned with SP = ϕ
hαP , i.e. the key for
Physician, the user is able to calculate the corresponding key SN for Nurse as long
as αP < αN . This process can be done as:
SN = ϕ
hαN = (ϕh
αP )h
αN−αP = (SP )
hαN−αP (3.1)
49
Algorithm 10 Decrypt
1: Start from the public attribute APub;
2: For each attribute An that the decrypter possesses, compute:
Zn,UIDdec · e(Xn,UIDdec , (C1,n)knC3,n)
e(Yn, (C2,n)knC3,n)
= e(ϕ,ψ)rUIDdec (In−1);
3: If e(ϕ,ψ)rUIDdec (In−1) is the decrypter’s private key, go to step 2 with attribute An−1;
else go to step 4;
4: Calculate
Sk = C/(e(C
′, DUID)/e(ϕ,ψ)rUIDdec (In−1)).
if DecSk(C
′′) == ROOT , Success; else Failure.
This means when attributes are assigned to UP , it is optional to assign the value
hαN−αP to the user together with SP . Thus, when the user needs to decode some
message dedicated for Nurse, he can easily calculate SN following equation (3.1).
However, if another user UN has the attribute Nurse, he cannot deduce SP following
the same equation in a similar way. This is because in this case, αP −αN < 0. Under
RSA assumption, h−1 cannot be efficiently computed due to the secrecy of n′.
A benefit of such extension to the original scheme is that it allows the ranking
relations among attributes without incurring too much workload on TTP. Only eli-
gible users, Physician owners in this example, can use such capability and the value
hαN−αP is only useful to eligible users.
It is necessary to clarify that the attribute authority can decide whether to assign
the value hαN−αP to a specific Physician owner or not. In other words, a Physician
owner does not automatically have the capability to derive his Nurse components
unless it acquires such value. Such derivation capability is carried out under the
control of TTP.
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With such knowledge, the TTP can assign two more values ∆h and ∆r to user
UP in KeyGen algorithms. When needed, the user can derive his key values corre-
sponding to attribute Nurse afterwards. The modified step 3 of KeyGen is as:
XP,UID = ϕ
rUIDSrPP ,
YP = ϕ
rP ,
ZP,UID = e(ϕ, ψ)
rUIDIP ,
LUID = T
1/PUID
Pub ,
∆h = h(αN−αP )rP ,
∆r = ∆hIN/IP .
Thus, the rUID for UP ’s Nurse attribute is changed to r
′
UID = rUID∆h. Correspond-
ingly, the following can be computed:
XN,UID = (XP,UID)
∆h = ϕrUID∆hSrPN = ϕ
r′UIDSrPN ,
YN = YP ,
ZN,UID = (ZP,UID)
∆r = (e(ϕ, ψ)rUIDIP )∆hIN/IP
= e(ϕ, ψ)rUID∆hIP = e(ϕ, ψ)r
′
UIDIP ,
L′UID = LUID.
Here, it is necessary to point out that to make sure the values of h for two com-
parable attributes are the same, comparable attributes need to be managed by the
same authority. This means one single authority defines the relative order between
these attribute values. This requirement is reasonable in real-world scenario since
in most cases a single authority (the hospital in this example) defines values of the
same attribute (job position). It is rare to require two separate authorities to define
separate values for the same attribute. Even if such conditions are needed, it can be
easily handled with Ontology-based attribute management solutions.
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3.4.4 Apply ABE-based Naming Scheme in ICN
With the above naming scheme, the following capabilities can be achieved in ICN
scenarios:
• A content owner is able to specify the access control policy without knowing
the consumers’ keys;
• The policy confidentiality can be fully protected from being leaked to adver-
saries;
• Step-by-step attribute exposure is enforced for consumers to determine their
eligibility efficiently in computation;
• Flexible attribute management is supported.
Using this scheme, any entity who wants to publish data contents needs to create
the content following the procedures shown in Fig. 3.3.
The owner firstly creates a random symmetric key K. Then the data to be pub-
lished is encrypted using K. The resulting ciphertext C is then used to generate
a metadata of C. Both the metadata and C are parts of the final content. Then
the owner needs to specify an access policy P of attributes, which identifies what
attribute requirements an authentic consumer should satisfy. After that, the owner
uses this policy to encrypt K following Encrypt algorithm. The result is used as the
content name.
In this way, the owner does not need to know individual public keys of all the
potential consumers in advance, which is required in traditional methods.
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3.5 Performance Analysis and Evaluation
The performance improvement provided by the proposed scheme is evaluated in
this section. In the following, the computation and communication performance is
presented in two parts: real-world implementation and complexity analysis.
3.5.1 Evaluation of the Naming Scheme
In this section, the ABE-based naming scheme is evaluated from performance
aspect. This includes analysis on its computation and communication (storage) over-
heads. The computation consumption analysis is carried out by comparing the pro-
posed scheme with existing ABE schemes. The communication comparison is carried
out on both the content name and the content itself respectively since they both are
transmitted in the network.
From computation perspective, the time consumptions for key generation, en-
cryption and decryption processes are tested. In real world application, the time
consumption for a consumer to decrypt the content’s name is much more important
than that for other functions. This is because each content is encrypted once, but de-
crypted by multiple users for multiple times. In addition to testing the real-world time
consumption for each function, a comparison is conducted on the decryption over-
head with existing ABE solutions: CP-ABE Bethencourt et al. (2007), CN scheme
Cheung and Newport (2007), NYO scheme (the 2nd construction in Nishide et al.
(2008)), YRL scheme Yu et al. (2008) and GIE scheme Huang et al. (2010). The idea
is to compare the number of most time-consuming operations needed in each scheme.
Such comparison is carried out in complexity analysis.
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3.5.2 Real-world Implementation
For real-world implementation, a machine with a four-core 2.80GHz processor and
4GB memory running Ubuntu 10.04 is used for experiment. Pairing-Based Cryptog-
raphy (PBC) Library Lynn (2014) is used to handle the pairing computations. A
type-A1 curve Lynn (2006) is generated using the parameter generating tools included
in this library for the following tests. It randomly generates the prime numbers used
for the curve, with a length of 512 bit for each of them.
Each operation is run for ten times for key generation, encryption and decryption
(Fig. 3.4). Here the policies are set to be a conjunctive clause of different number
(shown in x-axis) of attributes. This is because given a fixed number of attributes, this
form requires the most time for computation. In other words, it directly represents
the correlation between the number of attributes involved and the time needed for
computations. The reason why the encryption function consumes more time when the
number of attributes is small is that the cost for computing C in Algorithm 9 requires
an additional pairing operation, which is independent to the number of attributes.
When few attributes are involved, this additional pairing takes a high portion of the
entire time consumption. This portion reduces as the attribute number grows, which
explains why the time consumption for encryption eventually becomes the smallest
among the three functions.
In theory, the time consumption should be linear to the number of attributes
involved. The curve in Fig. 3.4 is not perfectly linear, but it meets the expected
growing trend. There are several reasons why it is not strictly linear. Before de-
crypting the message attribute by attribute, in the implemented program, there are
some necessary steps to initialize global parameters, read files and allocate memory
space. Similarly, at the end of the algorithm, there are some clean-up work involved,
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such as writing files and releasing memory space. Such time consumption is related
to the number of attributes involved but not strictly proportional. Also, at step 4
of Decryption algorithm, there is one additional pairing operation. Thus, when the
number of attributes is small, this additional operation takes more portion of the total
time than when the number of attributes is large. If the possible variance introduced
by system level factors, for instance the resource consumption from other processes,
are also considered, the variance in the figures is reasonable in practice.
3.5.3 Complexity Comparison
For comparison purpose, every atomic operation is tested for fifty times and the
average values are chosen as benchmarks for further comparison. Results of the exper-
iment (Table 3.1) show that pairing operation takes longer than any other operations.
Therefore, the comparison metric is set to be the number of pairing operations in de-
cryption process.
Table 3.1: Time-consumption of Different Operations (in milliseconds)
Pairing Exponentiation Multiplication Inversion
Time 7.675 0.491 0.029 0.024
Following the above-mentioned idea, there are some terms that need to be defined:
Nattr is used to denote the number of attributes a consumer has, Nall refers to the
total number of attributes defined in the network (Nall  Nattr). The proposed
naming scheme is denoted as ICN-ABE in the rest of this manuscript. Since the
policy is publicly known in CP-ABE and CN, decrypting parties are able to decide
what attributes to use in decryption. Therefore, for those who satisfy the policy, the
time taken for decryption in CP-ABE is proportional to the number of attributes
involved, which is denoted as Ninvo, Ninvo 6 Nattr. The time taken for a successful
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Figure 3.4: Computation Performance
decryption in CN is related to the number of attributes defined in the entire system.
This is because each user is assigned with a value (Positive, Negative, and Wildcard)
for every attribute defined in CN. It is obvious that unauthorized users would not
bother to try decryption, which is why an alternative result in both schemes is that
it takes 0 in time as the user would halt the decryption process.
An unauthorized user in GIE or ICN-ABE is not able to proceed with the de-
cryption process if it cannot satisfy the next attribute. In this situation, Npart is
used to denote the number of attributes that the consumer has already decrypted,
where Npart 6 Ninvo. Therefore, there are two possibilities for the computation cost
in GIE and ICN-ABE, one for a successful decryption and the other for a failed one.
Since OR-gate is not widely supported by all the ABE-schemes mentioned before,
the performance is tested with policies consisting of attributes and AND-gates. Test
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Table 3.2: Comparison of Computation Cost in Decryption
Scheme Hidden Policy Number of Pairings
CP-ABE No 2Ninvo + 1 or 0
CN No Nall + 1 or 0
NYO Yes 2Nattr + 1
YRL Yes 2Nattr + 2
GIE Yes 3Ninvo or 3Npart
ICN-ABE Yes 2Ninvo + 1 or 2Npart
result is shown in Table 3.2. It is necessary to point out that in real world, Nall is
much larger than Nattr. Therefore, CN scheme has the largest cost. Among all the
anonymity schemes, GIE and the proposed scheme cost less than NYO and YRL. As
a matter of fact, the cost of the proposed scheme is around 2 thirds of that of GIE.
To evaluate the communication costs, the size of content names are compared.
The purpose to compare network names is to make sure that names generated by the
proposed scheme do not consume much more storage space than existing solutions.
In PBC library Lynn (2014), a data structure element t with size of 8 bytes is used to
represent an element. For the proposed scheme, a block of 24 bytes is needed to store
the network name. Compared with this name size, a content in CBCB Carzaniga
et al. (2004) is identified by a set of attributes with corresponding values. The size
of this attribute set is determined by the content owners. Thus, it is reasonable to
model the names as a human-readable string of an undetermined size. NDN named
data (2015) shares a similar problem with the name size since the names in NDN
also consists of a number of human-readable strings. As mentioned before, DONA
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Koponen et al. (2007), NetInf Dannewitz et al. (2010) and PURSUIT Fotiou et al.
(2012b) share the same naming scheme. Therefore, only the size of DONA’s name is
used for comparison. In Koponen et al. (2007), the size of a name is confined to 40
bytes in its protocol header. Thus, the size of network names in the proposed scheme
is small enough to fit in existing ICN solutions.
The number of attributes used in ciphertext is denoted as Nciph. For each attribute
in the policy, the corresponding ciphertext consists of 2 elements from G0 and 1
element from Zp in ICN-ABE. The total size of a ciphertext is 1G1 +(2Nciph+4)G0 +
NciphZp. This means the ciphertext consists of 1 element from G1, 2Nciph+4 elements
from G0 and Nciph elements from Zp. Comparison results are shown in Table 3.3. Here
the sizes of attribute policy in CP-ABE and CN are not considered. CP-ABE has
the smallest ciphertext size. Among the four schemes supporting anonymity, the
ciphertext sizes in NYO and YRL are much larger than those in GIE and ICN-ABE.
This is because these two schemes encrypt the ciphertext for all the attributes in
the network. GIE and ICN-ABE are of the same order of magnitude with ICN-ABE
performing better.
3.6 Security Analysis
From security perspective, the strength of the proposed scheme is analyzed based
on the attack model presented in Section 3.3.4. For the first attack goal, a security
theorem is provided with its corresponding security proof as in Section 3.6.2. For the
second goal, the scheme is analyzed based on details of the algorithms.
Theorem 1 Let G0 and G1 defined as in Section 3.4.4. For any adversary A, the
advantage it can gain from the interaction with the security game defined in Section
3.6.1 is negligible.
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Table 3.3: Comparison of Ciphertext Size
Scheme Ciphertext Size
CP-ABE 1G1 + (2Nciph + 1)G0
CN 1G1 + (Nall + 1)G0
NYO > 1G1 + (2Nall + 1)G0
YRL 1G1 + (3Nall + 3)G0
GIE NciphG1 + 3NciphG0
ICN-ABE 1G1 + (2Nciph + 4)G0 +NciphZp
The proof for this theorem is provided in Section 3.6.2. In the proof, it is verified
that the attacker cannot break the encryption algorithm to get any data exposed.
Furthermore, it is also proved that attackers cannot conduct collusion attacks onto
the system. This is because if collusion attacks are feasible, the adversary in the
security game of Section 3.6.1 can overcome the constrain that no single user can
satisfy the policy and still get the secret information decrypted. Thus, the attacker
is able to gain a non-negligible advantage in this game.
For the second attack goal, the attacker will stop at the first attribute, Ak, that he
doesn’t own in the decryption process. If he can get to know this additional attribute,
he must get it from step 3 in Algorithm 10. This means that the attacker possesses
the secret key Zi,UID of the attribute Ak, which contradicts to the assumption that
he does not possess such an attribute.
The rest of this section focuses on the proof of Theorem 1. Before going into details
of the proof, the security model in terms of a security challenge game is presented in
Section 3.6.1.
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3.6.1 ABE Security Model
In this section, the focus is placed on the naming scheme, which can be modeled in
the form of a game between a challenger and an adversary. The challenger simulates
the operations of the TTP and the attribute authorities, while the adversary tries to
impersonate as a number of normal network nodes. The game consists of the following
five steps:
• Setup. The challenger runs the GlobalSetup algorithm and returns to the
adversary the global parameters.
• Phase 1. The adversary can ask for a certain number of attribute keys in the
name of a number of different users from the challenger. The amount of allowed
keys and users are arbitrary. The challenger runs the NodeJoin algorithm
for each user involved in the requests and returns the corresponding secret
information. The adversary then plays in the roles of these users to request
for attributes from the challenger. The challenger runs the AuthoritySetup
algorithm to create parameters for authorities and runs the KeyGen algorithm
to generate the corresponding attribute keys that are requested by the adversary
on behalf of the authorities and the TTP. In other words, KeyGen in this game
is conducted all by the challenger itself. The challenger creates new authorities
only when it is necessary.
• Challenge. The adversary provides two messages M0 and M1 to the challenger
together with an access policy A. A satisfies that none of the users created by
the challenger has attributes satisfying A. It is possible that a combination of
attributes belonging to different users who are impersonated by the adversary
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can satisfy policy A. The challenger flips a coin b and encrypts Mb using A as:
C =
 e(ϕ, ψ)
αs if b = 1
e(ϕ, ψ)θ if b = 0
It then sends the ciphertext back to the adversary.
• Phase 2. The adversary can ask for more attributes and users from the chal-
lenger. But if any single user can gain satisfactory attribute combinations for
A, the challenger aborts the game. Up to now, all the attributes or attribute
keys mentioned in the game description refer to private keys. The adversary
can always request for any public keys, which is only for encryption purpose.
• Guess. The adversary makes a guess b’ on the real value of b.
The adversary’s advantage in this game can be defined as ADV = P [b′ = b]− 1
2
.
The proposed scheme is secure if for all the polynomial time adversaries, the advantage
is at most negligible in the game.
3.6.2 Security Proof Sketch
In this section, the sketch for security proof is provided following the structure in
Bethencourt et al. (2007). Before going into details of the proof, the security game
described in section 3.6.1 is modified. This modification follows the same idea as in
Bethencourt et al. (2007) and it is intended to change from differentiating two random
messages M0,M1 to differentiating e(ϕ, ψ)
αsj , e(ϕ, ψ)θj so that the generated interme-
diate results can be represented using the four mappings that are to be introduced in
this section. The goal of such modification is essentially to facilitate the subsequent
security proof. To differentiate these two games, the one in section 3.6.1 is referred
to as Game1 and the modified game as Game2.
61
Modified Game
Game2 consists of five steps similar to Game1. The steps Setup, Phase1, and
Phase 2 are the same as in Game1. The Challenge step is different in that the
challenger does not choose one message to construct the ciphertext C. Instead, it
outputs Cj as:
Cj =
 e(ϕ, ψ)
αsj if b = 1
e(ϕ, ψ)θj if b = 0
Here, all the θj are randomly chosen from Z
∗
n′ following independent uniform
distribution.
Suppose an adversary adv1 in Game1 has the advantage of , his corresponding
adversary adv2 in Game2 can be constructed according to the following strategy:
• Forward all the messages between adv1 and the challenger during Setup,
Phase1, and Phase 2;
• In the Challenge step, adv2 gets two messages M0 and M1 from adv1 and
the challenge C from the challenger. adv2 flips a coin δ and sends C ′ = MδC
to adv1 as the challenge for adv1 in Game1. adv2 generates its guess based
on the output δ′ from adv1. If δ′ = δ, then the guess is 1; otherwise, it is 0.
The advantage that adv2 has in this game can be calculated as δ
2
.
In the following, it will be shown that no polynomial adversary can distinguish
between e(ϕ, ψ)αs and e(ϕ, ψ)θ. Therefore, no adversary can have non-negligible
advantage in the security model.
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Security Guarantee in the Modified Game
In this section, the proof sketch follows the generic group model introduced in Shoup
(1997) and uses a simulator to model the modified security game between the chal-
lenger and the adversary. The simulator chooses random generators ϕ ∈ Gs and
ψ ∈ Gt. It then encodes any member in Gs and Gt to a random string following
two mappings: f0, f1 : Zn′ → {0, 1}dlogn′e. It also encodes any member in G1 to a
random string in a similar way: f2 : Zn → {0, 1}dlogne. One additional mapping f3
is used to convert elements in Z∗n′ to string representations: f3 : Z∗n′ → {0, 1}dlogn′e.
These four mappings should be invertible so that the simulator and the adversary
can map between the strings and the elements of corresponding algebraic structures
in both directions. Four oracles are provided to the adversary by the simulator to
simulate the group operations in Gs, Gt, G1, and the pairing respectively. Only the
string representations can be applied to the oracles. The results are returned from
the simulator in such string representations as well. These oracles will strictly accept
inputs from the same group, i.e. strict enforcement on the input from the same group
for the respective group operations. The simulator plays the role as the challenger in
the modified game.
• Setup. The simulator chooses Gs, Gt, G1, e, ϕ, ψ, and random values α, β.
It also defines the mappings f0, f1, f2 and the four oracles mentioned above.
The simulator chooses the public attribute parameters IPub ∈ Z∗n′ , SPub =
f0(µ) ∈ Gs, TPub = f1(λ) ∈ Gt, and ROOT ∈ G1, where λ and µ are random
strings. The public parameters are Gs, Gt, ϕ := f0(1), ψ := f1(1), ϕ
β := f0(β),
e(ϕ, ψ)α := f2(α), (SPub, TPub, IPub), and ROOT .
• Phase 1. When the adversary runs NodeJoin for a new user with UID, the
simulator generates a random number rUID ∈ Z∗n′ . It returns to the adversary
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with DUID = f1((α+ rUID)/β), XPub,UID = f0(rUID)f0(µrPub,UID) = f0(rUID +
µrPub,UID), YPub = f0(rPub), and ZPub,UID = f2(rUIDIPub), here rPub,UID ∈ Z∗n′
is a random number chosen by the simulator. When the adversary requests for a
new attribute Ai that has not been used before, the simulator randomly chooses
Ii, ki, hi ∈ Z∗n′ and Si = f0(hi) ∈ Gs, Ti = f1(hi) ∈ Gt to simulate the process for
setting up an attribute authority for this new attribute. For each attribute key
request made from the adversary, the simulator computes Xi,UID = ϕ
rUIDSrii =
f0(rUID + hiri), Yi = ϕ
ri = f0(ri), and Zi,UID = e(ϕ, ψ)
rUIDIi = f2(rUIDIi),
where ri is a random number chosen from Z∗n′ . The simulator passes all these
values to the adversary as the attribute keys associated with Ai.
• Challenge. When the adversary asks for a challenge, the simulator flips a
coin b and chooses a random value s ∈ Z∗n′ . If b = 1, the simulator calculates
C = f2(αs); if b = 0, it picks a random value s
′ ∈ Z∗n′ and calculates C = f2(s′).
In addition, it calculates C ′ = ϕβs and C ′′ = EncK(ROOT ). It also computes
other components of the ciphertext following Encrypt: C1,n = f1((In−1−In)ln),
C2,n = f1(hn(In−1−In)ln), and C3,n = f3((kntn)−1), where hn ∈ Z∗n′ is a random
number chosen by the simulator.
• Phase 2. The simulator interacts with the adversary in a similar way as in
Phase 1 with the exception that the adversary could not acquire attribute keys
enabling a single user to satisfy the access policy A. The output of this step is
similar to that of Phase 1 except that the simulator obtains more user IDs and
attributes in this step.
From the above game, it can be seen that the adversary only acquires string
representations of random values in Z∗n′ , Zn and combinations of these values. All
the queries can be modeled as rational functions. It can further be assumed that
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different terms always result in different string representations Bethencourt et al.
(2007). As shown in Bethencourt et al. (2007), the probability that two terms share
the same string representation is O(q2/n), where q is the number of queries made by
the adversary. It is assumed in the rest of the proof that no such collision happens.
Now an argument can be made that the adversary’s views are identically dis-
tributed between the two cases when C = f1(αs)(b = 1) and when C = f1(s
′)(b = 0).
As a matter of fact, what the adversary can view from the modified game with the
simulator are independent elements that are uniformly chosen and the only operation
that the adversary can do on these elements is to test if two of them are equal or not.
Thus, the situation that the views of the adversary differ can only happen when there
are two different terms ν1 and ν2 that are equal when b = 1. Since αs and s
′ only
occur in group G1, the results from f1 cannot be paired. Queries by the adversary can
only be in the form of additive terms. Then it can be derived: ν1 − ν2 = γαs− γ′s′,
where γ is a constant. By transformation, it can be written as: ν1 − ν2 + γ′s′ = γαs.
This implies that by deliberately constructing a query ν1 − ν2 + γ′s′, the adversary
may be able to get the value of e(g, g)γαs. Now it needs to be proved that such a
query cannot be constructed by the adversary based on the information it gets from
the modified game.
In fact, the information that an adversary can acquire from this game is listed as
in Table 3.4. This table excludes values related to LUID as it is not related to αs. To
construct the desired value, the adversary can map two elements from Gs and Gt into
one element in G1. He can also use elements in Zn to change the exponentials. From
this table, it can be easily seen that to obtain a value containing αs, the adversary
can pair βs and (α + rUID)/β to get αs + rUIDs in G1. In fact, this is the only way
to get a term containing αs. But it is not feasible. Both βs and (α+ rUID)/β belong
to Gt while the pairing requires one element from Gs and one from Gt respectively.
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A more detailed illustration for the above argument is that: by conducting the
query on behalf of the users that the adversary has established in Phase 1, the ad-
versary can get a polynomial γαs +
∑
UID∈Uquery γrUIDs, where Uquery is the set of
UIDs used by the adversary. To eliminate the second part in this polynomial, the
adversary can use items in the table containing In−1− In and rUID to construct desir-
able polynomial. But this is impossible for the adversary under the game assumption
because:
• Firstly, the adversary can’t reconstruct s from either tn(In−1− In)hn or (In−1−
In)hn since the hns are chosen as random values for each attribute that it is
impossible to get s =
∑
n∈Pa(In−1 − In) + IPub from them without peeling off
the hns. Here, Pa represents the set of attributes satisfying the policy;
• Secondly, the adversary can’t reconstruct s from IPub and Ii in Zp. This is be-
cause no single user is assumed to satisfy the attribute policy that the adversary
cannot reconstruct a valid attribute combination satisfying the policy. Thus,
he cannot find the constitution of Pa for the equation s =
∑
(In−1− In) + IPub.
• Thirdly, the item with rUID cannot be canceled.
Therefore, based on the information an adversary can get from the proposed
scheme, the attacker can not differentiate a random ciphertext from an authentic
one. The security of the proposed scheme is proved. 
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Table 3.4: Query Information Accessible to the Adversary
µ β rUID + µrPub,UID
rPub hi rUID + hiri
ri (In−1 − In)hn tn(In−1 − In)hn
λ (α + rUID)/β βs
hi
α rUIDIPub rUIDIi
IPub Ii ki
(kntn)
−1 hi
3.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, a comprehensive access control solution for ICN network is pro-
posed. This solution is based on a privacy-preserving ABE-based naming scheme.
This scheme greatly reduces the communication and computation overhead compared
to existing ABE solutions. Also, this scheme is designed in a public-key pattern, mak-
ing it more flexible for attribute management. From security and privacy perspective,
the ABE-based naming scheme achieves a high security level as CP-ABE, but with
attribute anonymity protection for policy privacy and flexible attribute rankings. Ex-
periments and analysis confirm the effectiveness of the proposed solution.
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Chapter 4
ATTRIBUTE DELEGATION FOR ID-REVOCABLE ATTRIBUTE BASED
ENCRYPTION
4.1 Introduction
Following the research work on Attribute Based Encryption (ABE) in the pre-
vious chapter, a notable issue came up in real world application scenarios. Under
certain circumstances, the size of attribute policies would be very large in order to
accommodate the need for a set of targeted users.
4.1.1 ID-revocable Attribute Based Encryption
The complex attribute policy issue comes from the fact that the policies in ABE
aim to use combinations of attributes to represent or denote a set of individual users.
When there are a large portion of shared attributes among these users, the policy can
be constructed nice and simple. However, if such condition is difficult to satisfy, a
very complex policy tree may be the only solution with attributes. The corresponding
computation and communication/storage costs would therefore be too large for ABE
to be applied in such circumstances, when it is compared with traditional cryptogra-
phy algorithms or access control mechanisms.
One extreme example of such scenarios is when the targeted users are all the
entities who own a certain attribute, except for a specific user. Following the example
in health care, this attribute can be Physician. Under certain circumstances, a
specific physician (who is denoted as John) at a hospital is rules out of a secret
message that is prepared for all the other physicians at the hospital. There are several
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possible cases when such scenario is true. For instance, John may be temporarily
suspended from his duty. Or the content of the message has certain relation to John.
Therefore, to avoid conflicts of interest, John is determined by hospital administrators
not suitable for this message. Similar reasons can be listed on and on, none of which
is rare in real world scenarios.
In traditional Attribute Based Encryption solutions, to avoid involving John as
this message’s intended receiver, the only option is to use attributes that are not
owned by John. In this example, Physician is definitely not a choice. Instead, it is
necessary to find out all the attribute combinations that are shared by part of the
rest of physicians. This can be done level-by-level to rule out the targeted revocation
user, John. For example, medical department, such as Cardiology and Pediatrics, can
be used to identify people that are not from the same department as John. Other
attribute genre will need to be used to further identify the physicians who work with
John in the same department. Obviously, the resulting policy is much more complex
than using a single attribute Physician.
The above-mentioned example is only for the cases when a single user needs to
be excluded from a group. Cases can become much more complicated when the
number of users for such exclusion is bigger, the size of the user group is larger,
and the constitution of the group is very complicated, e.g. people from different
organizations. Under such circumstances, relying solely on attributes to construct
the policy is not an efficient solution. Intuitively, it can be easier and simpler if it is
possible to rule out the limited number of outliers by their IDs.
Following this idea, several researchers at SNAC group of Arizona State Univer-
sity carried out a study on the feasibilities of enabling ID-revocation in Attribute
Based Encryption schemes. Two schemes were eventually developed and is ready for
publication. With such schemes, user IDs are embedded into the key components of
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user attributes when they are assigned by the Trusted Third Party (TTP). These two
schemes are referred to as the baseline schemes in the rest of this chapter.
4.1.2 Attribute Delegation Issue
The work in this chapter is based on such ID-revocation ABE scheme to further
explore approaches to make it more applicable in real-world scenarios. Specifically,
this chapter aims to solve the issue with key delegation features in such scheme.
Attribute delegation function is supported from the first Ciphertext Policy-ABE
scheme Bethencourt et al. (2007). Most of the subsequent schemes proposed after-
wards do support such delegation function as one of its five core functions. The
delegation function allows a user with attribute set A to be able to generate and
assign attribute keys of set A′, A′ ⊆ A, to other users.
The goal of such function is to help reduce the work load of the TTP in assigning
attribute keys. However, as the f parameter is included in the public key PK in
Bethencourt et al. (2007), there is no limitation on the number or the kind of at-
tributes that a user is allowed to generate/delegate. Thus, any authentic user in the
system is able to generate and assign unlimited amount of attribute keys that are in
its own attribute set to other users, who are not guaranteed to be authentic users.
In real world application scenarios, this means that the authenticity of the in-
tended attribute owners may be jeopardized. When the TTP assigns attribute keys
to users, there is a authentication and authorization process associated with it. Such
process protects the attributes from being assigned to wrong owners or even adversary
parties. However, when a normal user performs the delegation function to generate
attribute keys to other users, there is a risk that the users with the newly assigned
keys may not be the ones that should be allowed to possess the attributes. In other
words, the standards of trust at the TTP and a normal user may be greatly different.
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Therefore, the delegation function provides a potential adversary with an additional
way to gain an attribute that he is not authorized to own.
Following the health care example used in the previous chapter, if the TTP is
assumed to be in charge of attribute assignment at hospital A, then the traditional
delegation approach allows any Physician at this hospital to assign this attribute to
any users not in this system. In real life, it is much easier to gain trust from a human
user than the TTP through different approaches, social engineering as an example.
Thus, it is desirable to design a delegation approach that can help prevent abuse of
delegation functions in ABE schemes.
This chapter aims to conduct a preliminary study on such issue. An exploration
of possible approaches and their relationships with each other is conducted. Based on
that, a restricted delegation approach for the ID-revocable ABE scheme is proposed.
The contribution of the work in this chapter can be summarized as:
• This is the first work, according to the author’s knowledge, on how to control
the use of delegation functions in ABE schemes. Existing ABE schemes use a
component in the public key to enable delegation, which is in a lack of control
on such capability;
• For the ID-revocable ABE scheme proposed before, a corresponding delega-
tion scheme is proposed in this chapter to enforce control over the delegation
function.
4.2 Related Work
In this section, related works are introduced in two parts: the delegation scheme
in original ABE schemes and the ID-revocable ABE scheme that this chapter studies
on.
71
4.2.1 Delegation Scheme in Original ABE Schemes
In the original CP-ABE scheme Bethencourt et al. (2007), the TTP sets up the
entire system and publishes the public key to every user within the system. One of
the component in the public key is f = g1/β. This is used in the Delegate function
to generate authentic secret key components for another user. The newly generated
key components need to satisfy two conditions:
• It is authentic in that it can be used in encryption and decryption in the same
way as a key directly obtained from the TTP;
• The newly generated key should be different from the keys belonging to the
delegation user. Otherwise, it does not make much sense as a simple copy of
the delegation user’s key materials will do the same work.
In other words, one of the assumptions hold in the rest of this chapter is that no
user will give a copy of his own keys to any other party in the system.
As the value of f is publicly known to every participants in the ABE system,
any party who has a set of assigned attribute keys from the TTP is able to generate
unlimited amount of new keys for these assigned attributes. The TTP itself has
no control over such behavior. What is worse, the TTP does not even know who
has been assigned with attributes through the delegation process. In this way, one
extreme resulting scenario is that every participant is able to get a delegation key
component for any attribute from a delegation party in the ABE system. In other
words, the entire ABE system may fail if the delegation function is abused without
proper restrictions.
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4.2.2 ID-revocable ABE Scheme
As mentioned in Section 4.1.1, it is necessary to provide a flexible ABE scheme that
supports the revocation of individual identities in policy construction. In this way,
it provides an additional metric (identity) to existing attribute-only policy construc-
tions. In some ABE schemes, users may also treat individual identities as attributes.
However, these schemes uses identities in the same way as traditional attributes in
policy construction. Therefore, they do not help simplify the attribute policy, but
make it more complex.
In the rest of this chapter, identities are treated as a new set of metrics that are
used differently from attributes. If attributes are treated as one dimension to describe
a subject, identities can be viewed as another dimension that has no overlapping
common set with attributes. Specifically, one identity is mutually exclusively owned
by one single user. No two or more users share the same identity.
In the ID-revocable ABE Scheme that this chapter is based on, identities for each
user is embedded in his assigned attribute key components. In other words, the
TTP uses the users identities as one of the input to generate the attribute keys for
corresponding users. A normal user cannot forge his attributes even though he knows
his own identity. A benefit of such approach is that if a user leaks his attribute keys
to other unauthorized users, his identity is embedded in the keys. This makes it
possible to trace back to the person who initially leaked the keys. In traditional ABE
scheme, it is impossible to do so.
When a certain party wants to encrypt a message, he not only creates an attribute
policy for the encryption process. He also needs to provide a list of identities that
should not be allowed to access the message. The combination of the attribute pol-
icy and the identity list determines the group of authorized users. Any user whose
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identity is on this list is not able to decrypt the message. This is enabled through
a mathematical trap that makes the denominator of a fraction become zero. For
authorized users, the fraction denominator equals to the numerator, thus making the
overall value equals to the identity element. The list of unauthorized users’ identities
are published together with the ciphertext to make sure anybody who receives a copy
of the ciphertext is aware of such list.
4.3 Discussion on Attribute Delegation
Problem Statement: The goal of restricted attribute delegation is to block an
attribute assignee from further acting as an delegation party for certain attributes
assigned by the TTP.
Restricted delegation is in fact a very important feature for attribute delegations.
Without a properly designed system to support it, authentic users may be able to
grant privilege to untrusted parties. For instance, an authentic user may have a lower
standard or an incomplete view of the standard for assigning a certain attribute. He
may assign the attribute to an attacker based on his partial judgment. In other cases,
an authentic user may accidentally or intentionally assign an attribute to unqualified
users. Under such circumstances, the TTP is virtually deprived of his control over
the attribute management.
How to view the attribute delegation capability is an important starting point.
Under a general assumption, the entire delegation hierarchy is a tree structure rooted
at the TTP. From the TTP’s perspective, ruling out the attribute capability of a
certain node is removing a subtree. As long as the root of the subtree is revoked,
the children in that subtree are revoked. In other words, what is desired is an on-off
switch associated with a certain node in the tree so that the TTP or any other parent
to that node is able to toggle the switch.
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Under different application scenarios, the requirements on restricted delegation
are different. Here, mainly three scenarios are proposed and discussed: breadth-first
restriction, depth-first restriction, and hybrid restriction.
For breadth-first restriction, the goal is to enable a parent to be able to block
some of his children, which are referred to as blocked users, from further delegating
an attribute or a set of attributes. All the children of the blocked users are deprived
of the attribute. In other words, an on-off switch needs to be implemented for the
parent so that he can make a binary decision on whether allowing further delegation
of certain attributes or not. If the delegation relationship is viewed as a tree structure,
the goal of this category is to disable a sub-tree of the original delegation tree. Such
decision is made at the root of the sub-tree. As in the example of Figure 4.1, if
the TTP in the delegation tree specifies blocking delegation of his child A, user A is
allowed for possessing the attribute while none of the grandchildren (User D and E)
is able to do so. The delegation capability of A is blocked though A still possesses
such an attribute.
Figure 4.1: Breadth-First Restriction.
For depth-first restriction, the goal is to allow a parent to designate the maximum
depth (or number of levels) of delegation relationship allowed in the delegation tree
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structure. It differs from the previous category in that the parent can block not only
the immediate children, but also grandchildren depending on how many levels he
specifies. In the example of Figure 4.2, the root node TTP specifies that the target
attribute can be delegated by its children for one more level, meaning only up to its
grandchildren can have such attribute. In this case, the delegation capability of D
and E are blocked, making it impossible for F to get such attribute from D.
Figure 4.2: Depth-First Restriction.
It is necessary to stress that in both Figure 4.1 and 4.2, delegation restrictions can
be enforced by any node that possesses the attribute (blue nodes in both figures), not
necessarily the root of the whole tree, i.e. the TTP. Thus, at each node, the effect
of delegation restrictions is a combination of all the rules set by every node along
the path from itself to the root. For example, the effect at node F in Figure 4.1 is a
combination of rules set by TTP and node C. Following such combination idea is the
hybrid restriction.
For hybrid restriction, the goal is to block specific individual child or grandchild
from being able to further delegate the target attributes. This category is more
general, yet more difficult to achieve. By specifying black list of unwanted attribute
delegates, the TTP is able to rule out the delegation capability of certain nodes.
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This requirement is very similar to attribute revocation. The only difference is in
the capability that is being revoked: attribute delegation v.s. attribute ownership.
Hybrid restriction is the most flexible delegation control form that suits most of the
application scenarios.
Before going into further details, there is one more assumption that needs to be
emphasized. Obviously, if an attribute owner A sends an exact copy of his attribute
components to an illegal attribute assignee B, the assignee does possess the same
capability as an authentic owner of that attribute. Under such circumstances, it
is obviously impossible to prevent A from enabling B with the attribute capability.
However, such action will not be treated as a violation of the restricted attribute del-
egation capability this work is targeting for. This is because there is no new attribute
components created during the entire process. It is more of a key management issue
than attribute delegation. Thus, one assumption to follow is that:
Assumption:
A delegation key is guaranteed to share no key component with the original key
it is derived from. This includes both the K part and the Kx part.
Starting from the simplicity point of view, it would be possible if a trap can be
added to the original CP-ABE attribute key component. The trap plays as the on-off
switch so that the attribute assigner is able to decide whether to allow the assignees
to further delegate.
An interesting problem with attribute delegation is: how to blindly block a group
of users from being able to use an attribute. The issue is that in the original CP-ABE
scheme, there is no way to exclude an organization of users out of a certain decryption
other than specifying a certain attribute that exclusively identifies that organization.
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This incurs heavy attribute management workload in applications. Such issue comes
from a lack of connections between the TTP and its attribute assignees in the at-
tribute key components. With the proposed schemes, such connection is established
through the ID value in the key component. Following this idea, anonymous attribute
delegation is further illustrated with a use case.
A typical application scenario where the anonymous attribute delegation plays
an important role is when the key of an organization A is compromised. Under
such circumstances, every attribute key assigned under organization A needs to be
revoked. Following the previous examples, an application scenario in health care is:
the administrator at hospital A is compromised and therefore all the attributes within
the hospital should be voided. Next time when Department of Health and Human
Services(HHS) sends out a message, those attribute owners in hospital A should not
be able to use their attributes for a successful decryption.
In the proposed preliminary scheme in the next section, this scenario maps A to
a user who also has the capability for attribute delegation from TTP. Following the
idea of delegation algorithm, a user’s key is generated using A’s ID as the ID value in
the generated key components. Thus, when needed, all the keys can be anonymously
revoked by TTP using A’s ID, even though the key owners’ IDs are not known to
TTP (HHS in this case). With such capability, the TTP does not have to be aware
of the individual users under each organization. Instead, when needed, the keys can
be more efficiently revoked with the anonymous attribute delegation. The fact that
the TTP does not need to know individual users’ identities provides certain degree of
anonymity to the system. All the TTP needs to know is the identity of the delegation
party, in this example, the hospital.
The preliminary scheme solves the issue of enforcing permission on delegation
functions by the TTP. However, it only supports one identity in each attribute key
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component. If used as the delegation agent’s identity, the individual users’ identities
are not included in the keys. Thus, it is impossible to revoke those identities when
used with the id-revocable ABE scheme. What’s more desirable is a scheme that
is able to support revocation based on both delegation agency’s identities and the
attribute key users’ identitites.
4.4 Proposed Delegation Scheme for ID-revocable ABE
Continuing from previous discussions, two categories of attribute delegation schemes
are proposed. As a preliminary solution, the first scheme allows only one identity in
the key attribute components for delegation. Based on this scheme, a further step
on attribute delegation is that both individual users and delegation agents, organi-
zations for instance, can be revoked at the same time. To enable such capability,
two IDs need to be embedded, one for individual users and the other for delegation
agents, into ciphertexts and attribute keys. Following this idea, a modification to the
preliminary approach will be presented.
4.4.1 Preliminary Attribute Delegation Scheme
Before going into details of the preliminary delegation scheme, it is necessary to
provide details of the scheme functions of the ID-revocable ABE scheme. It is a joint
work by the author with his advisor and two other members of the research group.
The scheme is as follows:
a. Setup(U , I)
The Setup algorithm takes an attribute set U and an identity set I as inputs, where
|U| = m and |I| = n. It chooses a group G of prime order p, a generator g of the
group, and m random group elements h1, h2, · · · , hm ∈ G that are associated with
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the m attributes in the system. It also chooses random exponents α, b ∈ Zp, which
are kept as the master secrets for the entire system.
Therefore, the public key is in the form:
PK = {g, gb, gb2 , e(g, g)α, hb1, · · · , hbm}.
The master secret key is in the form:
MSK = {α, b}.
b. KeyGen(MSK,S, ID)
S is the attribute set of user ID ∈ I. KeyGen algorithm chooses a random t ∈ Zp
and generates secret keys for user ID as follows:
SK = (K = gαgb
2t, {Kx = (gb·IDhx)t}∀x∈S, L = g−t).
c. Encrypt(PK, (M, ρ),M, IDj)
Encrypt algorithm takes as inputs: an LSSS access infrastructure (M,ρ) and the func-
tion ρ associates each row of M to corresponding attributes. IDj is the identity to be
revoked. Let M be an l×n′ matrix. The Encrypt algorithm chooses a random vector
v = (s, y2, · · · , yn′) ∈ Zn′p . These values will be used to share an encryption exponent
s. For x ∈ [1, l], it calculates λx = v ·Mx, where Mx is the vector corresponding to
the x-th row of M . The Encrypt algorithm chooses random values r1, · · · , rl ∈ Zp.
Then, for message M, the ciphertext is presented as follows:
C =Me(g, g)αs,
C0 = g
s,
Cˆ = {C∗k = gb·λk , C ′k = (gb
2·IDjhbρ(k))
λk}∀k=1,...,l.
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d. Decrypt(CT,SK)
CT is the input ciphertext with access structure (M,ρ) and SK is a private key for
an attribute set S:
CT = (C,C0, Cˆ, (M,ρ)).
Suppose that S satisfies the access structure and let I ⊂ {1, 2, ..., l} be defined
as I = {i : ρ(i) ∈ S}. Let {ωi ∈ Zp}i∈I be a set of constants such that if {λi} are
valid shares of any secret s according to M , then Σi∈Iωiλi = s. If the identity ID
embedded in SK is not equal to the revocation identity IDj in the ciphertext, the
decryption process can be performed as:
e(C0, K)
(
∏
i∈I [e(Kρ(i), C
∗
i ) · e(L,C ′i)]ωi)1/(ID−IDj)
=
e(gs, gαgb
2t)
(
∏
i∈I [e((g
b·IDhρ(i))t, gb·λi) · e(g−t, (gb2·IDjhbρ(i))λi)]ωi)1/(ID−IDj)
=
e(gs, gα) · e(gs, gb2t)
(
∏
i∈I [e(g
b·ID·t, gb·λi) · e(htρ(i), gb·λi) · e(g−t, gb2·IDj ·λi) · e(g−t, hb·λiρ(i))]ωi)1/(ID−IDj)
=
e(g, g)αs · e(g, g)b2st
(
∏
i∈I [e(g, g)
b2tλi(ID−IDj)]ωi)1/(ID−IDj)
=
e(g, g)αs · e(g, g)b2st
(
∏
i∈I e(g, g)
b2tλiωi)
=
e(g, g)αs · e(g, g)b2st
e(g, g)b
2t
∑
i∈I λiωi
= e(g, g)αs
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e. Preliminary Delegation
K˜ = K · gb2t′ = gαgb2(t+t′),
K˜x = K
((t+t′)/t)
x = (g
b·IDhx)(t+t
′) = Kx · gb·ID·t′ · ht′x ,
L = g−t.
Here, hx is a random element selected by the TTP. It corresponds to one attribute
defined in the cryptosystem. Without a knowledge of hx, an entity cannot generate
an authentic K˜x value. When TTP allows a certain party to delegate an attribute,
it assigns hx to the entity. The entity selects a random value t
′. The other parts of
˜SK can be generated by the delegation agent based on public keys. Specifically, the
component K˜ can be calculated as product of K and gb
2t′ , where K is a part of the
delegation agent’s own key. K˜x can be calculated as the product of Kx, g
b·ID·t′ , and
ht
′
x . Here, ID is the identity of the delegation agent instead of the targeted user. g
b
is one of the public parameters that are published by the TTP with Setup() function.
With this approach, the value hx is what is needed to turn an ordinary user into
a delegation agent. Revealing the hx value to a user becomes a feasible approach
for restricting the delegation capability of the delegation agent. By providing a false
value, i.e. a mismatching t’ to hx, to the agent, he cannot generate authentic key
components of the key.
4.4.2 Modified Revocation-supporting Schemes
As discussed before, the preliminary scheme cannot sufficiently meet the demand
of revoking a delegation agency and/or an individual user at the same time. It is
desirable to be able to embed both delegation agency’s identity, which is named as
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delegation identity or delegation ID in the rest of this chapter, and user’s own identity,
which is referred to as user identity or user ID, in the same policy.
An ideal situation is that the delegation ID is a prefix of the user ID and a powerful
algorithm is able to revoke either a prefix or the entire length of the identity. However,
as explained before, the success of the ID-revocable scheme is based on the fact that
a denominator cannot be equal to zero. If prefix is used as in the perfect algorithm,
such foundation fact cannot be satisfied. Thus, this “perfect” solution is not feasible
in real-world application scenarios.
Comparatively, a less perfect, but more realistic solution is to assign two identities
(a delegation ID and a user ID) into the attribute key components. A user is not
allowed to successfully decrypt a ciphertext if both his delegation ID and his user ID
are in the list of revoked identity list constructed by the encrypting party. In other
words, this approach uses two lists, one for delegation IDs and the other for user
IDs, to realize the expected revocation goal. A user is not revoked from a successful
decryption if only his delegation ID or only his user ID is included in the lists. In
other words, a pair of (delegation ID, user ID) is used to pin-point to individual users.
This feature is supported based on the same fact that a denominator cannot be equal
to zero in decryption process.
In the rest of this section, two schemes are introduced. The first scheme is based
on the single-ID revocation ABE scheme that is a result of a joint research work by
the author and his colleagues. The second one corresponds to the scheme from the
same work for multiple ID revocation purpose. Both schemes presented below are
significantly modified versions following the discussion as illustrated in the previous
paragraphs.
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4.4.3 Single-ID Two-Level Revocation for CP-ABE Scheme (SID2LR-CP-ABE)
In the following, five functions are presented for SID2LR-CP-ABE scheme. The
first four functions are deep modifications of the previous research work, while the
last function is presented for the first time for restricted delegation purpose.
a. Setup(U , I)
The Setup algorithm is run by the TTP to set up global parameters for the entire
cryptosystem. It takes an attribute set U , where |U| = m. Depending on how the
keys for a specific user are generated, each user is assigned with a user identity from
the set I, |I| = n, and a delegation identity, which represents the delegator’s identity.
It chooses a group G of prime order p, a generator g, and m random group elements
h1, h2, · · · , hm ∈ G that are associated with the m attributes in the system. It also
chooses random exponents α, β, b ∈ Zp.
Therefore, the public key is published to all the entities in the system following
the form:
PK = {g, gb, gb2 , e(g, g)α, e(g, g)β, hb1, · · · , hbm}.
The Master secret key is in the form:
MSK = {α, β, b}.
They are the global secret that is only known to the TTP. A leak of the MSK
will compromise the entire cryptosystem.
b. KeyGen(MSK,S, ID)
This algorithm is run once for each user ID by the TTP. It generates the corresponding
attribute keys for the user. Here S is the attribute set of user IDu ∈ I, whose keys are
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taken from delegator IDd. KeyGen algorithm chooses a random t ∈ Zp and generates
secret keys for user ID as follows:
SK = (K = g(α+β)gb
2t, {Kx = (gb·IDuhx)t}∀x∈S, {K ′x = (gb·IDdhx)t}∀x∈S, L = g−t).
c. Encrypt(PK, (M, ρ),M, IDj)
This is the encryption algorithm that can be run by any user who encrypts a certain
message. Encrypt algorithm takes an LSSS access infrastructure (M,ρ) as input.
The function ρ associates each row of M to corresponding attributes. IDj is the user
identity to be revoked, IDh is the delegator identity to be revoked. Let M be an l×n′
matrix. The Encrypt algorithm first chooses a random vector v = (s, y2, · · · , yn′) ∈
Zn′p . These values will be used to share an encryption exponent s. For x ∈ [1, l], it
calculates λx = v ·Mx, where Mx is the vector corresponding to the x-th row of M .
The Encrypt algorithm chooses random r1, · · · , rl ∈ Zp. Then, for message M, the
ciphertext is presented as follows:
C =Me(g, g)(α+β)s,
C0 = g
s,
Cˆu = {C∗uk = gb·λk , C ′uk = (gb
2·IDjhbρ(k))
λk}∀k=1,...,l,
Cˆd = {C∗dk = gb·λk , C ′dk = (gb
2·IDhhbρ(k))
λk}∀k=1,...,l.
d. Decrypt(CT,SK)
This is the decryption algorithm that can be run by any user in this system. Here
CT is the input ciphertext with access structure (M,ρ) and SK is a private key for
a set S of attributes:
CT = (C,C0, Cˆ, (M,ρ)).
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Suppose that S satisfies the access structure and let I ⊂ {1, 2, ..., l} be defined
as I = {i : ρ(i) ∈ S}. Let {ωi ∈ Zp}i∈I be a set of constants such that if {λi} are
valid shares of any secret s according to M , then Σi∈Iωiλi = s. If the user identity
IDu combined in the SK is not equal to the revocation identity IDj in the ciphertext
and the delegation identity IDd is not equal to IDh in the ciphertext, the decryption
process can be performed as:
e(C0, K)
(
∏
i∈I [e(Kρ(i), C
∗
ui) · e(L,C ′ui) · e(K ′ρ(i), C∗di) · e(L,C ′di)]ωi)∆j,h
=
e(gs, g(α+β)gb
2t)
(
∏
i∈I [e((g
b·IDuhρ(i))t, gb·λi) · e(g−t, (gb2·IDjhbρ(i))λi) · e((gb·IDdhρ(i))t, gb·λi)
·e(g−t, (gb2·IDhhbρ(i))λi)]ωi)∆j,h
=
e(gs, gα) · e(gs, gβ) · e(gs, gb2t)
(
∏
i∈I [e(g
b·IDu·t, gb·λi) · e(htρ(i), gb·λi) · e(g−t, gb2·IDj ·λi) · e(g−t, hb·λiρ(i))
·e(gb·IDd·t, gb·λi) · e(htρ(i), gb·λi) · e(g−t, gb2·IDh·λi) · e(g−t, hb·λiρ(i))]ωi)∆j,h
=
e(g, g)(α+β)s · e(g, g)b2st
(
∏
i∈I [e(g
b·IDu·t, gb·λi) · e(g−t, gb2·IDj ·λi) · e(gb·IDd·t, gb·λi) · e(g−t, gb2·IDh·λi)]ωi)∆j,h
=
e(g, g)(α+β)s · e(g, g)b2st
(
∏
i∈I [e(g, g)
b2tλi(IDu−IDj) · e(g, g)b2tλi(IDd−IDh)]ωi)∆j,h
=
e(g, g)(α+β)s · e(g, g)b2st
(
∏
i∈I e(g, g)
b2tλiωi)
=
e(g, g)(α+β)s · e(g, g)b2st
e(g, g)b
2t
∑
i∈I λiωi
= e(g, g)(α+β)s, where∆j,h = 1/(IDu − IDj + IDd − IDh)
e. Delegate(SK, S˜)
To create a set of authentic attribute keys for a user A from a delegator’s own attribute
key, it requires the delegator to acquire some key elements from the TTP. Here, S˜ ⊂ S
is a subset of the attributes possessed by a delegator IDd, which is also the set of
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attributes for user A. The IDu of the delegator in Kx of KeyGen algorithm is in fact
the ID′d in K˜x. The goal is to create the key materials for ID
′
u, i.e. user A, based on
the key materials for the delegator. The generated attribute keys for user A are:
K˜ = K · gb2t′ = g(α+β)gb2(t+t′),
{K˜x = (gb·ID′uhx)(t+t′)}∀x∈S˜,
{K˜ ′x = (gb·ID
′
dhx)
(t+t′) = Kx · gb·ID′dt′ · ht′x = Kx · gb·IDut
′ · ht′x}∀x∈S˜,
L = g−t.
As a delegation agent, the required information from the new user A is his identity
ID′u. The delegator chooses a random value t
′ for the user and calculates K˜ as product
of the delegator’s own K and gb
2t′ . Here, gb
2
is a public parameter. Similar to the
preliminary scheme, hx is required from the TTP to convert a normal user to a
delegation agent. With t′ and hx, a delegator is able to calculate K˜ ′x. Here, the IDu
is the identity of the delegator. K˜x can be viewed as the product of (g
b·ID′uhx)t and
(gb·ID
′
uhx)
t′ . It’s not difficult for the delegator to calculate the value of (gb·ID
′
uhx)
t′ .
However, for (gb·ID
′
uhx)
t, the TTP has two options to enable the delegation capability.
The first option is that the delegator sends the user’s identity ID′u to the TTP and the
TTP calculates (gb·ID
′
uhx)
t for the delegator. The second approach is that the TTP
assigns the value pair (gbt, htx) to the delegator to allow the delegation capability. The
first option allows the TTP to control not only which attribute an agent is allowed to
delegate, but also which user is allowed to take the attribute from the delegator. The
cost for such advanced capability is the computation cost happened at the TTP. The
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second approach only allows the TTP to control which attribute an agent is allowed
to delegate. In either case, without the information from the TTP, the delegation
capability will be blocked. In other words, without such information, an ordinary
user cannot generate legit attribute key components for any other user in the system.
4.4.4 Multiple-ID Two-Level Revocation for CP-ABE Scheme (MID2LR-CP-ABE)
The above-mentioned scheme is designed for enabling restricted delegation capa-
bility while revoking a single user, i.e. a single pair of (delegation ID, user ID). To
further extend such a capability in real world application scenarios, a modified scheme
is presented below to support multiple ID revocation.
a. Setup(U , I)
This algorithm is run to establish the entire cryptosystem. The TTP generates global
security parameters through this algorithm. The algorithm takes an attribute set U
and an identity set I as input, where |U| = m and |I| = n. It chooses a group G of
prime order p, a generator g and m random group elements h1, h2, · · · , hm ∈ G that
are associated with the m attributes in the system. It also chooses random exponents
α, β, b ∈ Zp, which are kept as global secret keys.
Therefore, the public keys are output as:
PK = {g, gb, gb2 , e(g, g)α, e(g, g)β, hb1, · · · , hbm}.
These keys are published globally to every participant in this system.
The Master secret key is:
MSK = {α, β, b}.
MSK is stored securely at the TTP and is only known to the TTP itself. A leak
of this key will directly compromise the entire system.
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b. KeyGen(MSK,S, ID)
This algorithm is run by the TTP to generate individual attribute keys for each user.
The TTP runs this algorithm for each member of the system when they join in it. In
this algorithm, S is the attribute set of user IDu ∈ I. IDd is the delegation ID of
the same user. The algorithm chooses a random t ∈ Zp and derives the secret keys
for the user as follows:
SK = (K = g(α+β)gb
2t, {Kx = (gb·IDuhx)t}∀x∈S, {K ′x = (gb·IDdhx)t}∀x∈S, L = g−t).
Here, Kx and K
′
x are generated corresponding to each attribute that the user
owns. Thus, the overall size of SK differs from user to user and it is closely related
to the number of attributes a user has.
c. Encrypt(PK, (M, ρ),M,S)
This algorithm is designed for every user in the system. It takes an LSSS access
infrastructure (M,ρ) and a function ρ associates rows of M to attributes as input. Let
M be an l×n′ matrix. The algorithm chooses a random vector v = (s, y2, · · · , yn′) ∈
Zn′p . These values will be used to share the encryption exponent s. For x ∈ [1, l],
it calculates λx = v ·Mx, where Mx is the vector corresponding to the x-th row of
M . Let r = |S|. IDuj is used to denote the j-th user identity in S and IDdj denotes
the j-th delegation identity. The algorithm chooses random µ1, ..., µr ∈ Zp such that
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µ = µ1 + ...+ µr. The generated ciphertext is in the form as follows:
C =Me(g, g)(α+β)sµ, C0 = gsµ
C∗1,1 = g
b·λ1µ1 , Cu′1,1 = (g
b2·IDu1hbρ(1))
λ1µ1 , Cd
′
1,1 = (g
b2·IDd1hbρ(1))
λ1µ1 · · ·
C∗l,1 = g
b·λlµ1 , Cu′l,1 = (g
b2·IDu1hbρ(l))
λlµ1 , Cd
′
l,1 = (g
b2·IDd1hbρ(l))
λlµ1 ;
C∗1,2 = g
b·λ1µ2 , Cu′1,2 = (g
b2·IDu2hbρ(1))
λ1µ2 , Cd
′
1,2 = (g
b2·IDd2hbρ(1))
λ1µ2 · · ·
C∗l,2 = g
b·λlµ2 , Cu′l,2 = (g
b2·IDu2hbρ(l))
λlµ2 , Cd
′
l,2 = (g
b2·IDd2hbρ(l))
λlµ2 ;
· · ·
C∗1,r = g
b·λ1µr , Cu′1,r = (g
b2·IDurhbρ(1))
λ1µr , Cd
′
1,r = (g
b2·IDdrhbρ(1))
λ1µr · · ·
C∗l,r = g
b·λlµr , Cu′l,r = (g
b2·IDurhbρ(l))
λlµr , Cd
′
l,r = (g
b2·IDdrhbρ(l))
λlµr .
d. Decrypt(CT,SK)
In the decryption process, CT is the input ciphertext with access structure (M,ρ)
and SK is a private key for an attribute set S. Suppose that S satisfies the access
structure and let I ⊂ {1, 2, ..., l} be defined as I = {i : ρ(i) ∈ S}. Let {ωi ∈ Zp}i∈I
be a set of constants such that if {λi} are valid shares of any secret s according to
M , then Σi∈Iωiλi = s. If the identity IDu embedded in the SK is not equal to the
revocation identity IDuj in the ciphertext and the identity IDd embedded in the SK
is not equal to the revocation identity IDdj in the ciphertext, the decryption process
can be carried out as:
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e(C0, K)∏
i∈I(
∏r
j=1
[e(Kρ(i), C∗i,j) · e(L,Cu′i,j) · e(K ′ρ(i), C∗i,j) · e(L,Cd′i,j)]∆j)ωi
=
e(gsµ, gα+βgb
2t)∏
i∈I(
∏r
j=1
[e((gb·IDuhρ(i))t, gb·λiµj) · e(g−t, (gb2·IDujhbρ(i))λiµj)
·e((gb·IDdhρ(i))t, gb·λiµj) · e(g−t, (gb2·IDdjhbρ(i))λiµj)]∆j)ωi
=
e(gsµ, gα) · e(gsµ, gβ) · e(gsµ, gb2t)∏
i∈I(
∏r
j=1
[e(gb·IDu·t, gb·λiµj) · e(htρ(i), gb·λiµj) · e(g−t, gb2·IDuj ·λiµj) · e(g−t, hb·λiµjρ(i) )
·e(gb·IDd·t, gb·λiµj) · e(htρ(i), gb·λiµj) · e(g−t, gb2·IDdj ·λiµj) · e(g−t, hb·λiµjρ(i) )]∆j)ωi
=
e(g, g)αsµ · e(g, g)βsµ · e(g, g)b2sµt∏
i∈I(
∏r
j=1
[e(gb·IDu·t, gb·λiµj) · e(g−t, gb2·IDuj ·λiµj)
·e(gb·IDd·t, gb·λiµj) · e(g−t, gb2·IDdj ·λiµj)]∆j)ωi
=
e(g, g)αsµ · e(g, g)βsµ · e(g, g)b2sµt∏
i∈I(
∏r
j=1
[e(g, g)b2tλiµj(IDu−IDuj) · e(g, g)b2tλiµj(IDd−IDdj)]∆j)ωi
=
e(g, g)(α+β)sµ · e(g, g)b2sµt∏
i∈I(
∏r
j=1
e(g, g)b2tλiµj)ωi
=
e(g, g)(α+β)sµ · e(g, g)b2sµt∏
i∈I(e(g, g)
(
∑r
j=1
µj)b2tλi)ωi
=
e(g, g)(α+β)sµ · e(g, g)b2sµt
e(g, g)b
2tµ
∑
i∈I λiωi
= e(g, g)(α+β)sµ, where∆j = 1/(IDu − IDuj + IDd − IDdj)
With the value of e(g, g)(α+β)sµ and the ciphertext C, the message M can be
recovered successfully.
e. Delegate(SK, S˜)
Due to the fact that the key structure of both SID2LR-CP-ABE and MID-2LR-
CP-ABE are highly resemble to each other, the delegation algorithms are similarly
designed. To create a set of authentic attribute keys for a user A from a delegator’s
own attribute key, it requires the delegator to acquire some key elements from the
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TTP. Here, suppose S˜ ⊂ S is a subset of the attributes possessed by a delegator
IDd, which is also the set of attributes for user A. The IDu of the delegator in Kx of
KeyGen() function is in fact the ID′d in K˜X . The goal is to create the keys for IDu,
i.e. user A, based on the key materials for the delegator. The generated attribute
keys are:
K˜ = K · gb2t′ = g(α+β)gb2(t+t′),
{K˜x = (gb·ID′uhx)(t+t′)}∀x∈S˜,
{K˜ ′x = (gb·ID
′
dhx)
(t+t′) = Kx · gb·ID′dt′ · ht′x = Kx · gb·IDut
′ · ht′x}∀x∈S˜,
L = g−t.
Similar as in SID2LR-CP-ABE, the required information from the new user A is
his identity ID′u. The delegator chooses a random value t
′ for the user and calculates
K˜ as product of the delegator’s own K and gb
2t′ . Here, gb
2
is a public parameter
published by the TTP through Setup() function. Similar to the preliminary scheme,
hx is a required component to convert a normal user to a delegation agent. With t
′ and
hx, a delegator is able to calculate K˜ ′x. Here, IDu is the delegator’s identity instead
of the user A’s. K˜x can be viewed as the product of (g
b·ID′uhx)t and (gb·ID
′
uhx)
t′ .
It’s not difficult for the delegator to calculate the value of (gb·ID
′
uhx)
t′ . However, for
(gb·ID
′
uhx)
t, the TTP has two options to enable the delegation capability. The first
option is that the delegator sends the user’s identity ID′u to the TTP and the TTP
calculates (gb·ID
′
uhx)
t for the delegator. The second approach is that the TTP assigns
the value pair (gbt, htx) to the delegator to allow the delegation capability. As discussed
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before, the first option allows the TTP to control not only which attribute an agent
is allowed to delegate, but also which user is allowed to take the attribute from the
delegator. The cost for such advanced capability is the computation cost happened
at the TTP. The second approach only allows the TTP to control which attribute an
agent is allowed to delegate. In either case, without the information from the TTP,
the delegation capability will be blocked. In other words, without such information,
an ordinary user is not able to generate legit attribute key components for any other
user in the system.
4.5 Analysis on the Proposed Scheme
The schemes proposed in the previous section enable restricted delegation capa-
bility for ABE schemes. In this section, how these schemes can be used in different
application scenarios are discussed. Moreover, the performance overhead introduced
by these schemes, compared to previous solutions, is also analyzed in this section.
4.5.1 Application Scenarios
For the usage of the preliminary delegation scheme, a typical application scenario
is illustrated in Figure 4.3. The TTP defines three attributes globally in this exam-
ple. Following the restricted delegation feature, the TTP selects users ID1 and ID2
as delegation agents. These two agents are able to help reduce the burden of key
generation for the TTP. To some extent, they can help distribute and balance the
workload of the TTP. As illustrated in Figure 4.3, ID1 generates the attribute keys
for users ID3 and ID4 in green color while ID2 generates the keys for ID5 and ID6 in
red color.
The illustrated example is simple in that the number of attributes defined and the
amount of users involved are small. When extended to real world scenarios with larger
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amount of users and attributes, the effectiveness of such load-balanced delegation is
much more significant.
Figure 4.3: Preliminary Delegation Solution Application Scenario
The designs of SID2LR-CP-ABE and MID2LR-CP-ABE schemes are for the same
goals in terms of ID revocation functionality. Therefore, their application scenarios
are discussed together in this section. As illustrated before, using attributes only
to describe a certain set of users has its application limitations. Depending on how
each attribute is defined and assigned, cases are different. Using IDs together with
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attributes allows a user to represent a group of users with more concise policy con-
structions. Moreover, under certain circumstances, it also makes it possible to identify
certain sets of user combinations.
From delegation perspective, the goal is different. As mentioned before, instead
of allowing any user to generate unlimited key components, only designated users are
allowed to generate authentic new key components in the proposed scheme. Moreover,
this scheme overcomes the identity issue with the preliminary scheme discussed above.
In other words, the message encryption party is able to identify a specific (delegation
ID, user ID) pair to be revoked from decryption. In the preliminary scheme, as
there is only one ID embedded in the key components, a key generating party can
either assign a delegation ID or a user ID to the new keys, not both of them at the
same time. Therefore, the proposed scheme is more robust and more applicable for
real-world applications.
As shown in Figure 4.4, the TTP assigns three attributes to ID1 and ID2 re-
spectively. With the assigned attribute key components, neither ID1 nor ID2 is able
to generate new key components by themselves or by collusion with each other. To
further generate keys for ID3 and ID4, ID1 requests for permission from the TTP.
From the angle of the TTP, it is able to disable a certain delegation capability from
three levels:
• Delegation Agent: As shown in Figure 4.4, ID2 is revoked from further delegat-
ing his attributes to other users in the system. In other words, with the proposed
scheme, the TTP is able to deprive any user of his delegation capability;
• Delegation Attribute: This corresponds to the case of Attr1 under ID1 in Figure
4.4. The TTP is able to identity which specific attribute that a user is requesting
for delegation purpose based on the proposed schemes;
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Figure 4.4: Proposed Delegation Solution Application Scenario
• Delegation Receiver: Using the proposed scheme, the TTP is also able to trace
and block a certain user from getting an attribute key assigned by a delegation
agent. This corresponds to the case of ruling out ID3 from the key delegation
scenario in Figure 4.4.
Delegation Agent level corresponds to the need for an on-off switch in the delega-
tion hierarchy in order to enforce restricted delegation capability as discussed before.
It is the basis for other delegation restriction forms.
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Delegation attribute is a new level that allows the TTP to define if a certain at-
tribute is suitable for delegation purpose. For different attributes, their corresponding
meanings and sensitivities in real world vary a lot. For sensitive attributes, it is of-
ten preferred to be managed and assigned by the TTP only, in order to maintain a
high level of security. The issue with delegation is that it involves more participants
into the key management and assignment process, which incurs more risk to security
breaches. The TTP is assumed to have the highest security level in most scenar-
ios, while a delegation agent is not guaranteed for the same capability. Delegation
attribute allows the TTP to keep the control of certain attributes to itself.
Delegation Receiver allows the TTP to rule out certain users from getting attribute
keys from a delegation agent. Similar to the discussion in the previous paragraph,
some users may not be able to directly acquire certain attribute keys from the TTP
due to their lack of trust by the TTP. Therefore, a feasible approach for them is to get
a key component from a certain delegation agent as long as he can obtain trust from
that agent. From the TTP’s perspective, such approach is harmful to the integrity
of the entire cryptosystem. The Delegation Receiver feature allows the TTP to block
such approach so that certain users are virtually excluded from the system.
4.5.2 Delegation Agent Federation
One issue that comes with the proposed schemes is that if a user gets attribute keys
from two or more delegation agents, these keys cannot be used for decryption at the
same time. This is because the Delegation ID embedded in these attribute keys are
different from agent to agent. Another reason is that the random value t’s selected
by these agents are not guaranteed to be the same by default. Therefore, under
traditional system assumptions, these keys from different agents are not compatible
with each other.
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However, if the assumption is changed to that the Delegation Agents are selected
by the TTP carefully such that they can be trusted at the same level as the TTP,
then such issue can be solved. As mentioned in the Delegate function sections of each
scheme, the crucial parts that define a delegation key are IDd and t. When all the
Delegation Agents are trusted, there is no need to revoke a specific agent. Therefore,
the value of IDd can be set to a common value IDD. When an agent creates keys for
a user, this value IDD is used as the delegation ID in the user’s key. In this way, all
the delegation ID values in the delegation keys are set to the same value. Therefore,
the Delegation ID difference issue is solved.
The other issue that needs to be addressed is the random value t. One approach
for such issue is secure multi-party computation. The goal is to compute a random
value t by all the Delegation Agents. This approach is secure, but it requires a large
amount of computation and communication cost among all the Delegation Agents.
When applied in mobile environment, such requirements are not easy to be satisfied.
Another approach is to make the user as the media for communications among all the
agents. When the first agent gets a request for attributes from a user, it randomly
chooses the value for t and use other agents’ public keys to encrypt the random value.
The results are sent back to the user so that next time when it requests attributes
from another agent, it needs to present the ciphertext to the agent so that the value
t can be acquired by the agent.
Following the above discussion, the proposed schemes can be extended to support
federation among Delegation Agents. It is worthwhile to point out that the discussion
presented above is a special application case of the proposed schemes.
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4.5.3 Performance Complexity Analysis
From performance perspective, it is worthwhile to analyze the cost for the addi-
tional delegation features introduced in the proposed schemes. In this section, such
cost is further divided into computation cost and storage cost. A comprehensive anal-
ysis on the proposed schemes is provided in terms of complexity with regard to the
notations listed in Table 4.1. Among all the schemes, there are five functions: Setup(),
KeyGen(), Encrypt(), Decrypt(), and Delegate(), respectively. The analysis is carried
out corresponding to the same function in each scheme in terms of computation cost
and storage cost.
Computation Complexity Analysis
When analyzing the computation complexity, it is necessary to find out the most
time-consuming operations involved in all the schemes. In fact, there are mainly four
types of operations that are time-consuming: Pairing, Exponentiation, Multiplica-
tion, and Inversion. According to Li et al. (2014), the most computation-intensive
operations are Pairing and Exponentiation. Thus, in this section, the amount of pair-
ing operations and that of exponentiation operations needed for each function are
taken as metrics for computation complexity. The complexity of all the schemes in
the two metrics are presented in Table 4.2 and Table 4.3 respectively. The schemes
OIDR-CP-ABE and MIDR-CP-ABE are the base schemes for SID2LR-CP-ABE and
MID2LR-CP-ABE, respectively. The analysis is presented as follows:
In the original CP-ABE scheme, the amount of pairing operations needed for
Setup() function is 1. Pairing is only incurred in calculating for the value of e(g, g)α.
For the other four schemes, the number of pairing needed in Setup() is also 1 for the
same reason that only e(g, g)α in the global key materials require a pairing operation.
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Table 4.1: Notations.
Sym Meaning
p the prime order of the multiplicative cyclic group G
g the generator of the multiplicative cyclic group G.
m the number of attributes defined in the system.
U the attribute set defined in the system, |U| = m.
n the number of identities in the system.
I the identity set defined in the system, |I| = n.
α a random element chosen by TTP from G.
b a random element chosen by TTP from G.
M a message to be encrypted by the system.
M a l × n matrix
ρ a function that associates rows of M to attributes.
Ax the x-th row of A.
S the set of attributes created for a specific user.
S˜ the set of attributes used for delegation purpose.
l the number of attributes involved in the encryption process.
r the number of identities involved in the encryption process .
Due to such fact, it is more important to focus on the amount of exponentiation
operations involved in the five schemes. In CP-ABE, the amount of exponentiation
needed in Setup() function is 3. However, in both OIDR-CP-ABE and MIDR-CP-
ABE, the amount of such operations required is m + 3, where m is the amount of
attributes defined globally as illustrated in Table 4.1. Such difference comes from
the fact that each attribute is defined as a value hx in CP-ABE, while it is de-
fined as hx
b in both OIDR-CP-ABE and MIDR-CP-ABE. For SID2LR-CP-ABE and
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Table 4.2: Computation Complexity Comparison in Pairing Operations
Function CP-ABE
OIDR-
CP-ABE
MIDR-
CP-ABE
SID2LR-
CP-ABE
MID2LR-
CP-ABE
Setup() 1 1 1 1 1
KeyGen() 0 0 0 0 0
Encrypt() 0 0 0 0 0
Decrypt() 2|I|+ 1 2|I|+ 1 2|I|r + 1 4|I|+ 1 4|I|r + 1
Delegate() 0 0 0 0 0
Table 4.3: Computation Complexity Comparison in Exponentiation Operations
Function CP-ABE
OIDR-
CP-ABE
MIDR-
CP-ABE
SID2LR-
CP-ABE
MID2LR-
CP-ABE
Setup() 3 m+ 3 m+ 3 m+ 4 m+ 4
KeyGen() |S|+ 2 |S|+ 3 |S|+ 3 2|S|+ 4 2|S|+ 4
Encrypt() 3l + 2 3l + 2 3lr + 2 5l + 2 5lr + 2
Decrypt() |I|+ 1 |I|+ 1 |I|r + 1 |I|+ 1 |I|r + 1
Delegate() 2|S˜|+ 1 2|S˜|+ 1 2|S˜|+ 1 4|S˜|+ 1 4|S˜|+ 1
MID2LR-CP-ABE, the additional computation cost is one more exponentiation op-
eration, compared to OIDR-CP-ABE and MIDR-CP-ABE respectively. Such cost
difference is relatively small in real-world application scenarios.
In all the five schemes, there is no need for any pairing operation in preparing for
the keys of any user. Comparatively, exponentiation operation is the key contributer
to the time cost in this function for all the three schemes. In CP-ABE, the number
of exponentiations needed is |S| + 2. In both OIDR-CP-ABE and MIDR-CP-ABE,
such number is increased to |S|+ 3, which is a small increase. For SID2LR-CP-ABE
and MID2LR-CP-ABE, such number is doubled due to the additional component for
each attribute. It is clear from the table that the time consumption is linear to the
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number of attributes assigned for a user if the major time-consuming operation is
exponentiation.
When it comes to the Encrypt() function, the computation cost in terms of pairing
operations is zero for all the five schemes. The amount of exponentiation operations
is more useful in differentiating the computation cost among these schemes. In both
CP-ABE and OIDR-CP-ABE, it takes 3l+ 2 exponentiations for encryption process.
Here l is the number of attributes involved in the encryption process. It can be seen
that SID2LR-CP-ABE and MID2LR-CP-ABE need about 2/3 more computation cost
than OIDR-CP-ABE and MIDR-CP-ABE, respectively, in terms of exponentiation
operations. The increased cost is still of the same order of significance as OIDR-CP-
ABE and MIDR-CP-ABE. Such increase mainly comes from the more time needed
in encryption with the additional delegation keys.
The Decrypt() function is the most time-consuming one among the five functions
as it incurs more pairing operations than the other three functions. In CP-ABE,
the number of pairings needed is 2|I| + 1, where I is the set of attributes involved
in the decryption process. It requires the same amount of pairings in OIDR-CP-
ABE. SID2LR-CP-ABE and MID2LR-CP-ABE almost double the amount of pairings
as in OIDR-CP-ABE and MIDR-CP-ABE respectively. In the decryption process,
the contribution from exponentiation is much less because the amount of pairings
is significant in Decrypt() function. The numbers of exponentiations in these five
schemes are |I|+ 1, |I|+ 1, |I|r + 1, |I|+ 1, and |I|r + 1, respectively.
For Delegate() function, the costs for pairing operations are zero for all the five
schemes. In terms of exponentiation operations, the cost for original CP-ABE, OIDR-
CP-ABE, and MIDR-CP-ABE are all 2|S˜|+ 1. For SID2LR-CP-ABE and MID2LR-
CP-ABE, such numbers are almost doubled to 4|S˜| + 1 in both cases. The major
increase comes from the fact that the key components for each attribute are doubled
102
in SID2LR-CP-ABE and MID2LR-CP-ABE schemes due to the additional cost for
delegation ID related computations. The same reason also contributes to the changes
in KeyGen() function.
Storage Complexity Analysis
Table 4.4: Storage Cost Comparison
Function CP-ABE
OIDR-
CP-ABE
MIDR-
CP-ABE
SID2LR-
CP-ABE
MID2LR-
CP-ABE
Setup() m+ 5 m+ 6 m+ 6 m+ 8 m+ 8
KeyGen() |S|+ 2 |S|+ 2 |S|+ 2 2|S|+ 2 2|S|+ 2
Encrypt() 2l + 2 2l + 2 2lr + 2 3l + 2 3lr + 2
Delegate() |S′|+ 2 |S′|+ 2 |S′|+ 2 2|S′|+ 2 2|S′|+ 2
When it comes to storage cost, the case is different in that there is no additional
storage cost for Decrypt() function as its results are directly used as the final plain-
text. For storage cost, only the storage space for final results of each function is
considered. In other words, the storage for temporary variables that are normally
used in computer memories are not considered. Each element used in the functions is
a member from one of the four groups: G1, G2, GT , Zr, which is stored as an element t
data structure in PBC library Lynn (2014). Therefore, the number of such elements
is used as a metric for storage cost analysis. Table 4.4 summarizes the overall cost
corresponding to each function in all the five schemes.
In Setup() function, the resulting storage cost is used for storing PK and MSK.
It takes m+ 4 for storing PK in the first three schemes. The same cost for the latter
two schemes is m + 5, due to the addition of e(g, g)β. The storage cost for MSK
is 1 in CP-ABE and 2 in both OIDR-CP-ABE and MIDR-CP-ABE. The same cost
for SID2LR-CP-ABE and MID2LR-CP-ABE is 3. Overall, the additional storage
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cost, compared with the former three schemes, is small and constant, which is not a
significant issue in applications.
In KeyGen(), the cost for the first three schemes is |S| + 2. However, the same
cost in SID2LR-CP-ABE and MID2LR-CP-ABE is almost twice as that in the first
three. This comes from the need for two components corresponding to each attribute
value: one for delegation ID and the other for user ID. As mentioned before, this is
the approach how the proposed two schemes achieve their designed functionalities.
Thus, such additional cost is necessary.
The storage cost for Encrypt() function, which equals to the size of the ciphertext
generated in this phase, is 2l + 2 in both CP-ABE and OIDR-CP-ABE. The size of
ciphertext in MIDR-CP-ABE is larger than the former two schemes, which is 2lr+ 2.
For SID2LR-CP-ABE and MID2LR-CP-ABE, the same cost is almost 1.5 times of
that for OIDR-CP-ABE and MIDR-CP-ABE, respectively. Such difference also comes
from the fact that an additional pair of key components need to be generated for each
delegation ID.
Based on the analysis presented above, it can be seen that the overall costs in both
computation and storage is no more than twice as those in the corresponding baseline
schemes. Between the two proposed schemes, the SID2LR-CP-ABE scheme performs
better than MID2LR-CP-ABE in both computation cost and storage cost. This is
straightforward as SID2LR-CP-ABE is functionally less powerful than MID2LR-CP-
ABE. The overall costs for both schemes are practical for real-world applications.
4.5.4 Real-world Implementation
To further evaluate the real-world time consumption, the proposed schemes are
implemented in C language using PBC library Lynn (2014) on Ubuntu 14.04 64bit
operating system. The hardware configuration for the machine that runs the exper-
104
iment is: Intel i7 Quad-core CPU at 2.60GHz; 8GB memory. To test the relations
between the amount of attributes involved and the time consumption, the number
of IDs revoked is fixed to 1 and the number of attributes that are involved in each
of the four functions, Setup(), KeyGen(), Encrypt(), and Decrypt(), is gradually in-
creased. In other words, the first test is run for the SID2LR-CP-ABE scheme. The
time consumption of these functions are tested separately.
For each attribute setting, the experiments mentioned above are run for ten times
and the average values, in milliseconds, are taken as the results, which are presented
in Figure 4.5.
Figure 4.5: Relations between the Amount of Attributes and Time Consumption
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As can be seen in the figure, the time consumption for all the four functions
are generally linear to the number of involved attributes. The cost for KeyGen() is
much larger than that for the other three functions. This is because the KeyGen()
function requires a process for random element generation and element setting in
implementation. Such process takes much more time than pairing or exponentiation
operations. It happens once for each attribute. Therefore, this function takes the
largest time cost. As in real applications, KeyGen() is run once for each user. It is
relatively less frequent than Encrypt() and Decrypt(). Thus, such cost is acceptable.
For Setup() function, it is only executed once by the TTP when the cryptosystem
is established. The cost for Encrypt() and Decrypt() functions are more important
to applications as they are the most frequently used functions. With 45 attributes
involved, the cost for Encrypt() is right over 200 milliseconds. The cost for Decrypt()
under the same setting is less than 150 milliseconds.
To further explore the influence on the time consumption from the number of
IDs revoked, a second experiment is conducted with a fixed number of attributes
and changing numbers of revoked IDs. This experiment is an implementation of
MID2LR-CP-ABE scheme. In this experiment, the number of attributes is set to 20
and the number of revoked IDs is gradually increased from 1 to 10. The evaluation
result is shown in Figure 4.6. It can be seen that the time consumption of Setup()
and KeyGen() are not sensitive to the number of IDs revoked. This is because both
functions do not have the revoked ID list involved in their operations. Both Encrypt()
and Decrypt() follow a linear trend in Figure 4.6. The Encrypt() function is the most
sensitive one to the number of revoked IDs. When the number of revoked IDs is greater
than 6, with 20 attributes involved, the overall time cost for Encrypt() increases to
more than 1 second. The Decrypt() function is relatively less sensitive to the increase
of revoked ID amount.
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Figure 4.6: Relations between the Amount of Revoked IDs and Time Consumption.
When comparing Figure 4.5 with Figure 4.6, it can be seen that the time cost
is more sensitive to the number of revoked IDs than that of attributes as the curves
for Encrypt() and Decrypt() in Figure 4.6 increases much faster than those in Figure
4.5. Therefore, from performance perspective, it is recommended that a user should
increase the number of revoked IDs only when it’s necessary.
4.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, the idea of restricting the delegation capability in CP-ABE schemes
is proposed and discussed with details. Different feasible directions for realizing such
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capability are analyzed. Based on such analysis, two schemes that correspond to the
two ID-revocable baseline schemes are proposed. Such schemes allow users to enforce
restricted delegation capabilities in three different levels: Delegation Agent, Delega-
tion Attribute, and Delegation Receiver. Performance analysis on these schemes are
proposed in terms of their computation cost and storage cost. Here, the storage cost
is also referred to as communication cost in networking scenarios. Based on the per-
formance analysis, the proposed schemes provide restricted delegation features with
practical cost for computation and storage.
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Chapter 5
FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS
In this chapter, future research directions based on the work presented in previous
chapters are discussed. The discussion is organized as two parts: one on anonymous
communications in mobile environment and the other on further development for
ABE schemes.
5.1 Anonymous Communications in Mobile Environment
The proposed scheme in Chapter 2 aims to solve the anonymity issue in MANETs
by relaxing the strict system model assumptions so that it is more realistic for real-
world application scenarios. The scheme is able to handle the influence from local-
ization errors that are inherent with all localization techniques. It also helps reduce
the scale of the entire network. Other research directions that meet the real-world
requirements are worthwhile for further investigation. For instance, the relationship
between the amount of information leak and the ratio of monitored network. In the
proposed scheme in Chapter 2, the monitoring system is assumed to be able to mon-
itor the entire traffic in the target network. It is not clear that if the capability of the
monitoring system is reduced and only covers a small portion of the target network,
how the analysis result accuracy is deteriorated.
Anonymity issues with mobile networks have been an important topic for quite a
while. A main threat to anonymity in traditional MANETs is the link-based com-
munication patterns. For link-less approaches, ICN networking as a example, it is
worthwhile to further investigate on improving performance under certain security
guarantees. The proposed scheme in Chapter 3 works fine for enforcing access con-
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trol on contents. However, using ABE related scheme has a drawback that the time
consumption for encryption and decryption increases high when attribute policies
are large and complex. It is necessary to further explore more efficient and powerful
schemes for such purpose, whether it be ABE-based or not.
5.2 Further Development for ABE Schemes
Many of existing works on ABE schemes are focused on extending functional
capabilities. Such features include hidden policy, constant-length ciphertext, multi-
authority, comparable attribute values, ID revocation, and attribute revocation.
Hidden policy refers to the case that the attribute policy is protected in certain
ways so that anyone who obtains a copy of the ciphertext cannot directly read the
content of the policy. The constant-length ciphertext feature aims to break the re-
lation between the size of the attribute policy and that of the ciphertext as in the
original CP-ABE scheme. One direct benefit from this is that an attacker is not able
to correlate the size of the ciphertext to any information regarding the ciphertext
when all of them are of the same size. Multi-authority is a feature that supports
more than one single TTP in the entire cryptosystem. The feature of comparable
attribute values extends the meaning of attribute definition. In original ABE scheme,
each attribute value is defined as a nominal value. The comparable attribute feature
allows comparison between attribute values. Thresholds and intervals can be enforced
with such feature. ID-revocation allows a user to combine user IDs with attributes
when identifying a group of users through a policy. Under certain circumstances, it
allows to identify a group of users that cannot be directly specified through attribute
combinations only. It also helps reduce the size of policies, therefore also reduces the
computation and storage cost, in certain scenarios. The need for attribute revoca-
tion comes from the observation that it is impossible in some ABE schemes or would
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be very complex in other schemes to enforce a policy which specifies that a certain
attribute owners should definitely be excluded from decryption. Such issue lies in
the fact that one such attribute owner can simply avoid using that specific attribute
in the decryption process in the original ABE scheme and he will still succeed. The
original ABE scheme does not have such a mechanism to force a decryptor get all his
attributes involved in the decryption process. Therefore, such unwanted attributes
can be “hidden” by the decryptor without raising any error or alerts.
All the above mentioned features are very useful and desirable in real applica-
tion scenarios. They are of great value for future research work on ABE schemes.
However, each additional feature comes with a certain cost. The most straightfor-
ward cost is in terms of additional computation powers needed and extra storage
space/communication cost incurred. Another direct and difficult challenge to further
extensions is the feasibility issue. In other words, the more features get incorporated,
the less likely a feasible solution can be designed because each feature requires a spe-
cially designed scheme. Different special schemes are not compatible in most cases.
Even if it is feasible, the more features get involved, the more complicated the re-
sulting scheme will be. This directly incurs more additional performance cost. It is
always a great challenge to balance between functionality, cost, and security in de-
signing new ABE schemes. Security evaluation is another challenging direction that
comes with such extension works. Under different security assumptions, the corre-
sponding evaluation models and approaches are different. In many cases, such works
are unprecedented.
5.3 Restrict Delegation Capability in ABE Schemes
In Chapter 4, a pioneer work on restricting the delegation function in ABE schemes
is discussed, with a specific scheme designed for ID-revocable solutions as a concrete
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research outcome. Restricted delegation capability is worthwhile to be further ex-
plored in a broad scope for all the ABE schemes. Specifically, different levels of such
work, including those discussed in Section 4.3, need further investigation.
The majority of Chapter 4 solved the issue with breadth-first restriction. From
utility perspective, it is very useful to allow each delegation agent in a delegation tree
to specify his own delegation restriction rules. In a real world application scenario,
U.S. Department of Education (DoED) may play the role as the TTP. It defines global
parameters and creates attributes for all the education participants. Corresponding
attributes are assigned to education organizations to simplify the management over-
head on TTP. However, for different such organizations, DoED may have different
restrictions on how an organization can further delegate different attributes. For in-
stance, Arizona State University (ASU) may have a less rigid restriction than Mesa
Community College (MCC) due to its much bigger size. ASU also needs to further
allow delegations on some attributes at each of its schools due to its large populations.
ASU itself as a university may have different rules for different schools. Each depart-
ment under the same school also needs to further extend the delegation relation on
some attributes to further specify their management policies.
To realize more powerful delegation restriction capabilities, it is necessary to start
at the simple scenarios. The breadth-first solution serves as such a lead to future so-
lutions. Following the discussion in Section 4.3, the next step is to realize depth-first
restriction. This helps extend the control of a certain node in the delegation tree to
more than his direct children nodes. As in the above example, with such capability,
the DoED is able to control the delegation capability of School of Computing, Infor-
matics, and Decision Systems Engineering (CIDSE) at ASU, or even the Computer
Science department at ASU. Such capability can be realized by embedding secret into
delegation keys that are passed along multiple generations within a delegation tree.
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Both the breadth-first and the depth-first approach solve the delegation restriction
issue in an all-or-nothing way. A parent node in the delegation tree is only able to
enable or disable the delegation capability of a certain child node. It is not able to
provide fine-grained controls. For instance, a parent node cannot specify the amount
of children a certain node can create in the delegation tree. As shown in Figure 5.1,
the TTP cannot control the value of n, i.e. the amount of users that A can generate
delegation attribute keys for, with either breadth-first or depth-first approach.
Figure 5.1: Fine-Grained Restriction.
Such fine-grained solution is very useful in practice. As in the above example,
the DoED is able to put a limit on the number of schools ASU can create under its
administration. For some sensitive attributes, it is desirable for the TTP to be able to
track the number of assignees through the entire system, including those who obtain
the attributes via delegation.
Based on the work presented in Chapter 4, the depth-first restriction and the
fine-grained solution are two of the most important and interesting topics to work on
in attribute delegation. Other aspects that need further investigation include perfor-
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mance optimizations and security evaluations. As shown in Chapter 4, the delegation
restriction schemes proposed require additional computation cost and storage cost.
For all the ABE schemes, performance concerns are always a significant factor that
determines the wide application of such schemes. For security evaluations, delegation
function is entirely a different scope from the evaluation of a typical ABE scheme.
It faces different types of attacks, security assumptions, and security models. Due to
the novelty of restricted delegations, no previous work has been found on the security
evaluation of such topic. Thus, future work in this direction is of great importance.
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Chapter 6
SUMMARY
In Chapter 2, 3, and 4, one specific topic is discussed with proposed solutions
for the problems targeted respectively. All the work is summarized in this chapter
following the same sequence as they are presented.
The first topic of this dissertation is on the anonymity issue with MANETs. The
proposed work analyzes the issue from an attacking party’s perspective. If a powerful
monitoring system is deployed in the same area as the targeted MANET to passively
collect traffic of the MANET, what approaches can the attacker employ and how
much useful information can he get from such system. A clear view on such problem
provides insights on how much useful information is leaked in the wireless channel
from the MANET. More importantly, it provides guidance for proposing counter-
attack strategies on such issue.
Following this idea, an obstacle to applying the monitoring system in real world
scenarios is the localization errors that come with every system. This is the focus of
Chapter 1. The proposed scheme for super nodes is able to handle the influence from
localization errors. With such approach, the above-mentioned monitoring system for
anonymity analysis can be carried out in real life. This is the major goal of this part
of work.
Following the work on anonymity in Chapter 2, one conclusion that is made from it
is that the link-based communication pattern is a major contributor to the anonymity
issue. Therefore, a direct alternative is to use link-less communications. One such
solution is Information Centric Networking (ICN). ICN breaks the direct connections
between a message sender and corresponding receivers. Instead, messages are indi-
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rectly transmitted from one side to the other in the form of contents. In this way,
the two parties are decoupled in their communication behaviors.
However, the indirect communication pattern also introduces challenges in main-
taining a global content management mechanism, specifically in access control. For
this purpose, a new naming scheme in ICN based on Attribute-Based Encryption
(ABE) algorithms is proposed in Chapter 3. This scheme embeds the message en-
crypting key in content names, which are used for routing purpose in ICN. In this
way, a potential receiver is able to determine his eligibility in decrypting the content
through the content name at hand. Only permitted users are able to successfully
decrypt the ciphertext.
The proposed ABE-based scheme also achieves features such as multi-authority.
Such capability allows easy management on attributes among a number of trusted
attribute authorities. For attribute management, attribute delegation is another ap-
proach. It helps reduce the workload on the centralized TTP. It allows a normal user
to create and assign attribute keys to other users. However, it also introduces security
concerns. Unrestrained delegation capability is harmful to the entire cryptosystem.
To properly handle such an issue, restricted delegation functions are proposed in
Chapter 4. It is designed for an ID-revocable ABE scheme, but can also be extended
to other ABE schemes. With such capability, a TTP is able to determine which
attributes a specific user can further delegate. This serves as the first step of the
road-map to delegation restriction schemes, which is discussed in Chapter 4.
The overall arrangement of this dissertation follows the thread presented above.
For each of the three aspects, there is a performance evaluation to assess the overall
cost for the proposed solutions. Based on the discussions and the evaluation results,
future paths for continuing work in these aspects are presented in Chapter 5, which
is expected to serve as a reference for interested readers in these areas.
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